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Privacy by design is about making privacy part of the conception and development of
new data collection tools. But how should we interpret “privacy by design” as a legal mandate?
As it transitions from an academic buzzword into binding law, privacy by design will, for the
first time, impose real responsibilities on real people to do specific things at specific times. And
yet, there remains significant disagreement about what privacy by design actually means in
practice: we have yet to define its who, what, when, why, and how. Privacy by design is
unmoored and unclear. This Article fills that void. More specifically, this Article offers a new
paradigm, based on the law of products liability for design defects, for thinking about privacy
by design as a law. This Article shows how privacy by design and products liability arose in
similar socioeconomic contexts to answer similar questions and to achieve similar goals. It
makes sense, then, to look to products liability to explain the proactive obligations of
technology companies to design technology products with privacy and the needs of consumers in
mind.
INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
took effect on May 25, 2018, calls for privacy “by design and by default.”1So-called
“privacy by design” has also been endorsed by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)2 and the Office of the Attorney General of California.3 Privacy by design is
now the law. But beyond a general understanding that it refers to making privacy
part of the design process for new technologies, what privacy by design means in
practice is far from clear.4 That uncertainty is fatal to its transition from an academic
buzzword to a legal mandate: If neither regulators nor the regulated know what

1. See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter
Regulation 2016/679].
2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 22 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-erarapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Y575-Q9CE ]
[ hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY ].
3. C AL . D EP ’ T OF J USTICE , OFFICE OF THE A TT ’ Y G EN ., P RIVACY ON THE G O :
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM
1, 4 (2013), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2TFV-DDK7 ] (“Our
recommendations, which in many places offer greater protection than afforded by existing law, are
intended to encourage all players in the mobile marketplace to consider privacy implications at the outset
of the design process.”) (emphasis added).
4. The word “design” can mean many different things, from intentions (something is done “by
design”) to aesthetics (a room can be designed to be visually appealing). But, for the purposes of this
Article, I follow the broad definition outlined by Woodrow Hartzog in his book, Privacy’s Blueprint,
which defines design as the “processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their
creative processes instantiated in hardware and software.” WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2018).
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privacy by design means, they can neither enforce it nor comply with it. This Article
fills this void, situating privacy by design in the sociological and legal literatures and
ultimately providing a model for what a privacy by design statute should look like
in practice.
Any effective privacy by design statute has to answer five questions—namely,
the who, what, when, why, and how of design law. Upon whom are we imposing the
responsibility for privacy by design? Most definitions place the burden on data
collectors, processers, and technology companies.5 But this approach presumes a
particular, value-laden definition of “design” that sees it as entirely the company’s
responsibility.6 Sociologists of technology, many of whom have shown how the
design process is far more complex, would challenge that presumption.7
When do privacy by design’s obligations apply? The obvious answer—namely,
during “design”—is circular and implies that we can identify design’s clear
beginning and endpoint. But social scientists who study technology argue that
design is an ongoing, iterative social process that involves engineers and corporate
actors, users, exogenous social forces, and even the state. It also continues long after
widget version 1.0 is available for sale.8
What does privacy by design look like in practice? Academics and regulators have
offered a variety of visions for privacy by design, but none offer clear practical
guidance to industry or the courts. To some, a privacy by design law would list a set
of privacy principles;9 to others, it would require coding those principles into
technology’s architecture.10 Yet for others, it would mandate that technology
embody certain values.11 This uncertainty is not just fertile grounds for scholars.
Inside technology companies, the effects are real, contributing to frustration,

5. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48, which states that “the controller
shall, . . . implement appropriate technical and organisational measures . . . .” “Controller” is defined as
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others,
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data,” that is, the company behind a
technology product or website. Id. art. 4, para. 7, at 34.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. Bijker et. al eds.,
2012).
8. For a good summary of this literature, please see id.
9. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
(2009), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Privacy%20by%20Design%20-%207%20
Foundational%20Principles.pdf [ https://perma.cc/U7FH-BPED ].
10. See, e.g., Seda Gurses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by Design, in
COMPUTERS, PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that privacy engineering has the
potential to turn privacy by design goals into reality); see also Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy
by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1333, 1341–42 (2013) (arguing that privacy by design requires translating privacy principles
into code, both in the back-end infrastructure of data collection and front-end user interfaces).
11. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4 (laying out a series of guidelines for compliance with privacy
by design, including a series of pro-consumer social values); HELEN NISSENBAUM & MARY
FLANAGAN, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES (2014) (discussing the way in which game designers
integrate values into their products).
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inefficiencies, and confusion.12 Plus, the breadth of possible interpretations of
privacy by design leaves American and European courts, the FTC, and European
data protection authorities completely unbounded when they inevitably confront
the first design law questions.
Why are we imposing privacy by design mandates? Design’s significant, yet invisible,
capacity to manipulate those who exist inside its ecosystem requires us to consider
the values we want design to promote.13 There are a number of values that could
be at the center of privacy by design, ranging from enhancing user control to
protecting justice, fairness, and equality.14 A better understanding of the normative
goals of privacy by design can help companies and regulators determine if corporate
actions comply with both the letter and spirit of a privacy by design statute.
How can users pursue their right to privacy by design? Vindicating privacy rights is
an ongoing problem in the United States,15 where federal courts have gone out of

12. Several surveys have shown that organizations remain confused about GDPR compliance,
generally. See, e.g., Commvault, Global Survey Shows That 89% of Organisations Are Still Confused by
GDPR, BUS. COMPUTING WORLD (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.businesscomputingworld.co.uk/
news-post/global-survey-shows-that-89-of-organisations-are-still-confused-by-gdpr/ [ http://
web.archive.org/web/20180712205117/https://www.businesscomputingworld.co.uk/newspost/global-survey-shows-that-89-of-organisations-are-still-confused-by-gdpr/ ]; Survey Finds
That GDPR Is Still Confusing Global Organizations; And Preparations Are Lacking, CONTINUITY
CENT. (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.continuitycentral.com/index.php/news/erm-news/2318-surveyfinds-that-gdpr-is-still-confusing-global-organizations-and-preparations-are-lacking [ https://
perma.cc/74FU-5KTW ] ( 37% of companies report not knowing if they need to comply with the
GDPR ).
13. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEVBRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson-Smith
trans., 1991) (1984) (the nature of a space is determine by what designers want to happen to not to
happen in it); LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE RECONFIGURATIONS 186–92, 257–84 (2d ed.
2007) (arguing that users interact with technologies in ways defined by design); Steve Woolgar,
Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER,
TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 59, 67–69 ( John Law ed., 1991) (users are limited in what they can
do with a product given its design); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210,
225–27 (2007) (the design of online built environments limit user behavior just like the design of
physical environments).
14. Equality can be designed in. See, e.g., Rena Bivens & Oliver L. Haimson, Baking Gender Into
Social Media Design: How Platforms Shape Categories for Users and Advertisers, SOCIAL MEDIA
+ SOCIETY, Oct. 12, 2016, at 3–7 (gender binaries are baked into the design of social media platforms);
Rena Bivens, The Gender Binary Will Not Be Deprogrammed: Ten Years of Coding Gender on Facebook,
19 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 880, 880–81 (2017) (even with changes and developments, gender remains
designed into social media platforms).
15. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 750–56 (2018) (showing how courts conceive of data breach harms
exceedingly narrowly and deny standing to breach victims). In Europe, victims of privacy and data
harms have the benefit of national data protection authorities (DPAs). DPAs are regulatory agencies
that can enforce the data protection rights of EU citizens. They were created by the EU Privacy
Directive in 1995 as part of a multilayered approach to privacy enforcement in the European
community. See Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
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their way to put up barriers to privacy plaintiffs.16 Not knowing what privacy’s
design law requires of companies erects two more hurdles: it removes a benchmark
by which consumers and their lawyers can judge compliance and makes it difficult
to know how to litigate a potential case.
Without answers to these who, what, when, how, and why questions, design
law is at risk. The law would be open to wildly different interpretations from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, allowing companies to escape liability by fleeing to
friendly territories.17 Vague statutes also give corporate bureaucrats the chance the
define the law in ways that benefit their bottom line rather than consumers, putting
a thumb on the scale by the time the first court has its say.18
Such interpretive problems are nothing new. The limitations of language and
the legislative drafting process often result in statutes that leave their meaning and
details to those interpreting them.19 In those cases, courts and regulators look to
doctrinal guides and analogies to make sense of vague terms.20 Corporations,
investors, and other stakeholders need some manner of predictability as they plan
for a future within the confines of new legal requirements, like privacy’s law
of design.21

16. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545, 1550 (2016) (denying standing to data
breach victims because of an inability to demonstrate “concrete and particularized” harm resulting from
the breach).
17. See Ian Burrell, Billy Hawkes: The Irishman with a Billion People’s Privacy to Protect,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and tech/news/
billy-hawkes-the-irishman-witha-billion-people-s-privacy-to-protect-9115818.html [ https://perma.cc/
D6TS-K57X ]; Leo Mirani, How a Bureaucrat in a Struggling Country at the Edge of Europe Found Himself
Safeguarding the World’s Data, QUARTZ ( Jan. 7, 2014), http://qz.com/162791/how-a-bureaucrat-ina-struggling-country-at-the-edge-of-europe-foundhimself-safeguarding-the-worlds-data/ [ https://
perma.cc/LDR6-SVAY ].
18. LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL
RIGHTS (2016) (discussing how the internal systems created by regulated companies are often taken as
evidence of compliance with the law even when companies are actively resisting the goals of the law).
19. See e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594–96 (2002) (documenting “deliberate ambiguity”
in statutes); Adam C. Pritchard & Joseph A. Grundfest, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002); see also
FREDERICK REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43–53
(1975) (discussing how the inherent limitations of language create ambiguity in statutes).
20. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517
(1998); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 937 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 353 (1997); James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA
L. REV. 833 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 279–80 (1986) (showing that uncertainty in the law creates negative
externalities); Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 109–13
(2013) (regulatory and legal uncertainty deters investment and development of new business models);
see also JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 317–18 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“What farmer
or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or
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This Article fills this gap by proposing that a privacy by design statute should
incorporate the principles of products liability for design defects. This makes sense
because design is an exercise of power. Its strength comes from its breadth and its
invisibility (we often do not realize the myriad ways in which design affects our
lives).22 Good design can make our lives better, easier, or safer; bad design can cause
insecurity, pain, and inequality. As Don Norman wrote in The Design of Everyday
Things, “[w]ell-designed objects are easy to interpret and understand . . . . Poorly
designed objects can be difficult and frustrating to use. They provide no clues—or
sometimes false clues. They trap the user.”23 Predatory corporations have exercised
this power of design for years. When manufacturers built products with designedin dangers that consumers were unable to see, thus causing harm, the common law
developed the law of products liability to help victims obtain justice. This area of
the law, a tort-based regime that holds producers liable for the harm caused by
products they put on the market, addressed the same questions raised by privacy by
design, from who bears the responsibility of design to what those responsible
should have done to the values those obligations were meant to serve. And judges
imposed liability on corporate actors despite fuzzy definitions of design, in part
because of the social values—namely, fairness, justice, and the alleviation of power
imbalances—in the common law. Because designing for data collection creates
similar power imbalances and has the capacity to take advantage of users, privacy’s
law of design should be defined by analogy to products liability for design defects.24
Several scholars have already proposed using strict or products liability to
address some privacy and data breach harms.25 My argument is different. I am not

establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render
him a victim to an inconstant government?”).
22. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 21–55; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime
Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1039, 1043 (2002) (discussing how architecture and design can “increase the
cost of perpetrating crime, facilitate law enforcement, promote development of social norms of lawabiding and law-reinforcing behavior, and shape tastes against crime” without anyone knowing).
23. DONALD A. NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS 2 (1988); see also HENRI
LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991) (1984). For a
summary of how the design of both offline and online built environments can manipulate the behavior
of those within those environments, see, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 27–51; Julie E. Cohen,
Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and
Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 99–107 (2018) (collecting and discussing examples from fine art,
architecture, interior design, and urban design and comparing them to how companies design privacy
notices).
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. Various scholars have called for at least some version of a strict liability agenda to combat
data privacy harms. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 296 (2007) (arguing for imposing
strict liability on those who securely store and process our data); James Grimmelmann, Privacy as
Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L. J. 793, 827 (2010) (arguing for applying some strict liability principles to
data privacy, though cautioning against “import[ing] the full details of [products liability] doctrines,
warts and all, into privacy law”); Benjamin R. Sachs, Consumerism and Information Privacy: How Upton
Sinclair Can Again Save Us from Ourselves, 95 VA. L. REV. 205, 231 (2009) (noting the inability of users
to protect themselves).
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suggesting a new products liability tort for privacy-invasive design through which
individuals could sue technology companies and data collectors. Rather, privacy by
design is now a bare-bones statute that requires detail. Products liability has
untapped potential as a set of norms that can help define what that statute should
look like in practice. Several tort doctrines that have come to set the standard for
corporate behavior are helpful: risk-utility balancing, reasonable alternative design
(RAD), foreseeable unintended uses, and the duty to warn can all help describe what
a privacy by design statute should require.26
This Article answers the who, what, when, why, and how of privacy by design
as a legal mandate, providing a doctrinal and practical approach to what I am calling
privacy’s law of design. Part I lays out the problem: questions remain unanswered.
This Part challenges the assumptions embedded in some of the formulations of
privacy by design to date, particularly with respect to the meaning of design and the
role of companies, users, and others in that process, and highlights the uncertainty
remaining for companies and regulators to resolve. Part II proposes a new analogy:
products liability for defectively designed products. This analogy makes sense
because both design laws emerged in similar contexts and both are meant to address
the same underlying problem—namely, products that, outside of our view and
knowledge capacity, pose dangers that we cannot avoid. This Part applies products
liability principles to privacy by design and develops a concise, yet detailed vision of
what a privacy by design statute should look like. This Part concludes by discussing
the advantages to the approach and responding to objections. The Article concludes
with a short summary and avenues for future research.
I. PRIVACY BY DESIGN AS LAW
The various definitions of privacy by design in the academic literature agree
only that (1) design is a corporate responsibility; (2) corporations have to take
technological and structural steps to comply; and (3) they have to do so ex ante, or
before something goes wrong.27 But details remain hazy: calls for “privacy by
design”28 or “data protection by design and by default”29 leave the who, what, when,
why, and how of design law unclear.
Sociologists and science and technology scholars tell us that design is complex,
nuanced, and multifaceted.30 Design extends beyond meetings, coding, or product
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1.
28. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2.
29. See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.
30. Science and technology studies (STS) and sociologists of technology argue that technology
occupies space in society in ways that affect individuals and in ways that individuals affect technology.
In this field, technology products are cultural artifacts; our iPhones are not just hand-held computers
and telephones, but also exercises of social power and reflections of social needs. See, e.g., BRUNO
LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 9–16
(2005); SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (2d ed.
2010); THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 7.
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release dates to users and other social groups operating outside the company but
who nevertheless have the power to influence how products work. If that
scholarship, described in detail in Part I.A, is correct, design law’s allocation of
responsibility to companies loses its intellectual foundation and could be subject to
challenge.
In addition, saying that companies need to take technical and structural steps
to implement privacy by design stops far too soon. As described in Part I.B.,
scholars and experts have developed myriad definitions for privacy by design. That
very diversity poses practical and doctrinal risks. Technology companies trying to
comply with design law could choose any approach without any clear guidance as
to whether it will satisfy their obligations. Similarly, judges in different jurisdictions
trying to determine what the statute requires could opt for different approaches,
making enforcement arbitrary.
On top of this confusion is the question of values; in fact, current design law
appears to reflect a cacophony of values, described in Part I.B., as well. Therefore,
when judges and regulators turn to the purposes underlying a design law mandate
to answer new questions,31 their picture is hopelessly unclear. This Section explores
these gaps in more detail, arguing that privacy’s design law is open to so much
interpretation that it risks losing much of its power and potential.
A. Design: Who and When?
A law’s first job is to allocate responsibility: who is on the hook for
compliance? Each formulation of privacy by design answers this question in the
same way: the technology company. In this section, I argue that reflexively allocating
design law responsibilities this way rests on shaky intellectual grounds and that
confusion over when “design” occurs creates doctrinal incoherence in privacy’s
design law.
1. Corporate Responsibilities During Design
It seems obvious to almost everyone that technology companies should be
responsible for implementing privacy by design. The GDPR places design
obligations on data “controllers”32 and, to a lesser extent, the “producers of the
products” that “process personal data.”33 Ann Cavoukian, the former Information

31. This is particularly important in Europe, where courts are far more willing than those in the
United States to interpret a statute in line with its underlying purposes, or telos, and how it fits within
the overall aims of the European Union. See Jens C. Dammann, The Right to Leave the Eurozone, 48
TEX. INT’L L. J. 125, 137 (2013); Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 656, 664 (1997); see also Case C-173/06, Agrover Srl v. Agenzia Dogane, 2006
E.C.R. I-8810, ¶¶ 21–22 (giving “the purpose and general scheme” priority over the wording).
32. Article 25, section 1 states that a “controller shall” implement privacy by design. Section 2
puts the onus on controllers to ensure that that their platforms only process user data when necessary.
See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.
33. Id., recital 78, at 9.
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and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada and one of the earliest proponents
of privacy by design, placed the burden of implementing her “seven foundational
principles of privacy by design,” or PbD, on technology companies, as well.34 The
FTC says that privacy by design refers to companies “promot[ing] consumer privacy
throughout their organizations and at every stage of the development of their
products and services.”35 Further, Woodrow Hartzog has written about “design
boundaries in the form of flexible standards for companies.”36
Corporate responsibility has intuitive appeal. Currently, we bear the burden of
protecting our privacy.37 And we are notoriously ill equipped to do so effectively.38
Data collectors, on the other hand, have considerable power that, in the absence of
regulation, can be wielded against our interests.39 Indeed, for many platforms that
depend on a steady stream of personal information for targeted advertising, their
business interests conflict with privacy.40 Their data use practices can also be used
to discriminate against marginalized populations.41 Focusing privacy by design

34. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9.
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22.
36. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 121.
37. See id. at 21-25; see also Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Trans
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue 4 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/d
ocuments/public_statements/remarks-commissioner-julie-brill/100427tacdspeech.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/EG3M-3QHW ] (expressing dissatisfaction with the “traditional opt-out, ‘notice and choice’
model” that “inappropriately places the burden on consumers to read and understand lengthy,
complicated privacy policies that almost no one reads, and no one understands”).
38. See Ari Ezra Waldman,
There is No Privacy Paradox: How Cognitive Biases and Design Dark Patterns Affect
Online Disclosure, CURRENT ISSUES IN PSYCH. __ (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with author).
39. This is why Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, and others have proposed changing the legal
relationship between users and data collectors from one purely based on notice to one based on
fiduciary law. Under this approach, data collectors could not collect our data and use their power to
abuse, harm, or violate our trust. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make
Tech
Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346 [ https://perma.cc/K5CA-8M4C ]; see also ARI EZRA
WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 79–92 (2018)
(arguing that understanding privacy as a norm based on trust is essential for justifying the information
fiduciaries approach); Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health
Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 684 (2013) (“The increasing power of data to be used for both good
and ill arises from powerful trends within industry and computing science . . . [a]n era of ‘big data’
promises exhilarating and frightening opportunities to cure and exploit human vulnerabilities.”).
40. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 630 (2014) (noting that “Facebook’s business model is
focused on attracting third parties into monetized agreements for personal information”).
41. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2014) (showing how predictive analytics can
discriminate against marginalized populations); Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of
Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (“[C]omplex
scoring algorithms . . . [can] determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost
workers”); Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Rogone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data
Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 636–37 (2014).
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mandates on corporate actors interposes necessary friction between consumers and
powerful data collectors to stop this kind of predation.
Despite some contrary incentives, technology companies are also most
efficiently situated to make pro-privacy changes in design. As Guido Calabresi
argued in the context of allocating responsibility for accidents, liability should be
laid at the feet of the party who can most easily identify and inexpensively fix the
problem.42 Between asking users to navigate the labyrinthine path of privacy
management43 or hack into a platform’s code to protect their privacy, on the one
hand, and a company’s ability to integrate pro-privacy elements from the ground
up, on the other, the company has the capacity to more efficiently and effectively
make a difference.
And corporate decisions made during the lifecycle of data collection—from
conception, through design, to implementation—affect our privacy.44 Technology
products are not built in vacuums. They are built and sold by corporations,
collections of real persons working toward shared goals45 that can be influenced by
the people46 and ideas around them.47 New ideas at Microsoft, for example, are
influenced by CEO Satya Nadella’s deep personal commitment to accessibility.48
“Move fast and break things,” like the “hacker culture” that inspired that mantra,
inspires different design values.49 Scholars have shown that companies that consider

42. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (the party that could avoid an accident at lowest cost should be liable for the
accident even if he took due care).
43. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 21–55.
44. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
45. See Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W.K. Tsang, Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge Transfer,
30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 148 (2005) (corporations are vertical, structured networks of people
operating under a unified corporate identity).
46. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A
Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 631
(Mary Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012).
47. Adopting Bruno Latour’s distinction between the “ostensive” and the “performative”
aspects of behavior, see Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 SOC. REV. 264, 264 (1984), Martha
Feldman and Brian Pentland argue that executives are responsible for the “ostensive” aspect of
routines: setting the tone for action, laying out a mission, and creating policies that form best practice
guides. Then, routines are “performed” by workers on the ground: real people doing real work
translating ideas into action. Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational
Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 101 (2003).
48. See Satya Nadella, The Moment that Forever Changed Our Lives, MICROSOFT (Oct. 21, 2017),
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/accessibility/2017/10/21/satya-nadella-the-moment-that-foreverchanged-our-lives/ [ https://perma.cc/YPP5-JAD3 ]; see also Interview with Jules Cohen, Principal
Program Manager, Privacy, in Redmond, WA (Aug. 8, 2017) (notes on file with author) (noting that
accessibility is one of four factors always considered when developing new ideas particularly because of
Nadella’s personal commitment to the issue).
49. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 93 (2014) (“Engineers should be mindful of the fact that
products and services that they design are intended (also) for non-engineers. The Silicon Valley culture,
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user privacy concerns from day one are more likely to have respect for privacy
integrated into their corporate culture and, as a result, the products they sell.50
Therefore, encouraging corporate-wide respect for privacy by making corporations
responsible for design law during a broad timeline of design encourages the entire
company to take privacy seriously.
2. The Sociology of Technology
But that argument has a blind spot. It presumes the process of design is
complete by the time the manufacturer starts selling its product and, thus, is entirely
within the corporation’s control.51 However, science and technology scholars teach
us that design itself is not limited to teams of engineers working for a company. It
is a long-term, iterative social process that incorporates everything from a
company’s ethos to user innovations post product release. As a result, the
technology company does not always have the last word in design.52 This raises two
important questions that scholars, judges, and regulators working in design law have
yet to answer: First, if design is not exclusively a corporate project, why should
corporations be exclusively responsible for designing for privacy before users ever
see the product, especially since different users have different privacy preferences?

dubbed the ‘hacker way’ by Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, whose corporate credo is
‘move fast and break things,’ is not always aligned with broader societal values and expectations.”).
50. Oshrat Ayalon et al., How Developers Make Design Decisions About Users’ Privacy: The Place
of Professional Communities and Organizational Climate, in COMPANION OF THE 2017 ACM
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 135
(finding that a corporate climate dedicated to privacy has a more significant effect on engineers’
approach to privacy than internal policies, law, or corporate education programs).
51. Such control is often an important factor in the allocation of civil responsibility. In certain
jurisdictions, for example, the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, which helps victims prove liability when
an accident could not have happened without negligence. See Cal. Evid. Code § 646 cmt. (West 1970);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 17 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2005)
(requiring that the instrumentality of harm be under the defendant’s control); see also Schmidt v. Gibbs,
807 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ark. 1991); Hall v. Chastain, 273 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ga. 1980) (quoting Chenall v.
Palmer Brick Co., 43 S.E. 443 (Ga. 1903)). Premises liability, or the duty to take affirmative steps to
protect individuals coming onto one’s land, is predicated on the idea that landowners and occupiers are
the ones in control or possession of land. See, e.g., Rogers v. Jones, 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 350 (1976).
And in copyright law, we hold some third parties vicariously liable for the infringements of others only
if they had the “right and ability to control” the infringer’s behavior. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005).
52. And where control and its effects are not so easily assigned, the civil law often declines to
hold only one party responsible. The doctrine of comparative fault, for example, metes out liability only
according to the defendants’ level of harm caused. See, e.g., Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 1 Cal. App.
4th 1, 6 (1991) (stating that the purpose of comparative fault is “to prevent the unfairness of requiring
a tortfeasor who is only minimally culpable as compared to the other parties to bear all the damages”);
see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORM AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 144 (1997). Market share
liability is another example of civil law refusing to hold someone fully responsible when fault cannot be
easily assigned; it limits generic drug manufacturers’ exposure based on the likelihood their particular
drug caused harm. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 154 (2004).
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Second, what if users are at least partly responsible for the harm caused by
technology, like when racists on Twitter hijacked Microsoft’s AI chatbot and turned
it into a Hitler-quoting Nazi?53
Indeed, presumptive corporate responsibility reflects actor-network theory, a
particular, value-laden view of design that assigns agency to engineers, and
according to critics, erases users. Actor-network theory generally posits that artifacts
(like machines) do not just emerge out of nowhere; rather, they come into existence
as products of social relations, or actor-networks.54 A good example of an actornetwork in this context is a technology company like Google, Apple, Dropbox, or
any other small or large corporation. Executives, designers, marketers, and other
stakeholders interact with each other through corporate protocols and horizontal
teams to achieve a unitary goal of a new product, version, or platform. Users barely
factor into this model.
But as Susan Leigh Star has argued, this approach ends up focusing almost
entirely on the efforts of (mostly male) designers, or the ones that have the power
to position themselves with the right tools, with the right allies, and at the right
moment to push their designs to the forefront.55 Designers, then, become the
heroes of technology and society and the obvious bases of responsibility for design
law.56 This model, however, is overwhelmingly wealthy, white, and male, and
ignores the contributions of marginalized groups, social movements and activism,
and other social forces.57
The sociologist Steve Woolgar took a small step toward recognizing a broader
conception of design.58 He argued that designers “configure” users by learning from
beta tests and designing technology so it can only be used in certain ways, thus
limiting mistakes or other barriers to use.59 For just two examples, think of how our
computer ports are designed for specific inputs (a USB cable, for example, will not

53. See Elle Hunt, Tay, Microsoft’s AI Chatbot, Gets a Crash Course in Racism from Twitter,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/taymicrosofts-ai-chatbot-gets-a-crash-course-in-racism-from-twitter [ https://perma.cc/4QKP-RPMT ].
54. See Albena Yaneva, Making the Social Hold: Toward an Actor-Network Theory of Design,
1 DESIGN & CULTURE 273 (2009); see also LATOUR, supra note 30, at 9–16.
55. See Susan Leigh Star, Power, Technology and the Phenomenon of Conventions, in
TECHNOSCIENCE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONS 88–99 (Kristin Asdal, et. al eds., 2007).
56. This is reminiscent of the so-called “great man” theory of history. See, e.g., THOMAS
CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY (1840) (seeing men like
Muhammad, Shakespeare, Martin Luther, Rousseau, and Napoleon as the primary movers of history);
FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS, THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS (1913) (studying 386 rulers in Western
Europe from the 12th century until the French revolution to show their influence on history).
57. See, e.g., Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES ( June
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guyproblem.html [ https://perma.cc/DN8Y-TA5D ] (discussing the existence and effects of implicit bias
in future technology design given that most technology designers are white men).
58. See generally Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A
SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION ( John Law ed.,
1991).
59. Id. at 59, 61.
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fit in a Parallel Port) or the restrictions imposed by digital rights management.60
Users exist in this model; their input is, in fact, essential to the design process. But
they are, at best, represented by designers in a process that takes place entirely within
the walls of the technology company.61 Male designers, and their employers, still
remain the center of attention.
Like actor-network theory, Woolgar’s approach was also criticized as too oneway. The configuration and constraint in Woolgar’s work was limited to the
activities of heroic actors within the company that produced the technology. But
other people are involved too. Designers usually have to follow mandates from
executives and internal stakeholders.62 Exogenous forces play roles as well,
including journalists who call attention to design’s faults or data breaches, publicsector agencies that regulate technologies, policy makers that pass laws about them,
and social movements that advocate for just and fair uses of technology.63
And users do more than just follow restrictions laid out by designers. As Wiebe
Bijker and Trevor Pinch have shown, users are one of the many social groups
influencing design.64 Whereas Woolgar used the term “encoding” to describe the
mostly technological process in which engineers embed constraints on user
behavior into technology products,65 other scholars recognized that users have their
own “decoding” to do, a process during which users often identify entirely new uses
for machines.66 For example, when rural farmers, who initially resisted the
automobile as a threat to their way of life, started using the Model T as a stationary
power source on their farms, they became “agents of technological change”: the
next iteration of the car better reflected the ways in which these farmers were

60. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 580–88 (2003).
61. See, e.g., SUSAN DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1922 (1987)
(users developed new ways to deploy radio); CLAUDE FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992); MICHELLE MARTIN, HELLO, CENTRAL?: GENDER
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE IN THE FORMATION OF TELEPHONE SYSTEMS (1991) (women started
using the telephone to alleviate loneliness in rural areas, surprising telephone companies and forcing
changes to telephone construction); Ronald Kline & Trevor Pinch, Users as Agents of Technological
Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States, 37 TECH. & CUL. 763,
768–94 (1996) (showing how farmers used the car as a stationary power source, ultimately contributing
to changes in design).
62. See, e.g., Kline & Pinch, supra note 61, at 741–44; Nelly Oudshoorn, Els Rommes, & Marcelle
Stienstra, Configuring the User as Everybody: Gender and Design Cultures in Information and
Communication Technologies, 29 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 30 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Jessika van Kammen, Do Users Matter?, in BODIES OF TECHNOLOGY (A. Saetnan et
al. eds., 2000); Nelly Oudshoorn, On Masculinities, Technologies and Pain: The Testing of Male
Contraceptive Technologies in the Clinic and the Media, 24 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 265 (1999).
64. See Trevor J. Pinch & Weibe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or
How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit from Each Other, in THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe Bijker et al. eds., 1987) (describing the
author’s social construction of technology, or SCOT, model).
65. See Woolgar, supra note 58, at 39.
66. Hugh Mackay et al., Reconfiguring the User: Using Rapid Application Development, 30
SOC. STUD. SCI. 737, 739, 750, 752 (2000).
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deploying it.67 Bijker has shown that when the high-wheeled bicycle was introduced,
older men refused to use it, designating it as unsafe, which paved the way for the
development of a new, safer, smaller-wheeled bicycle several years later.68 Indeed,
many scholars have recognized that users identify new uses for products that
designers never intended, thus ultimately changing the design.69
Already, the neat narrative of design as an exclusively corporate or engineering
project that ends at product release is at least fuzzier. Feminist approaches to
technology break down the corporate narrative entirely. Ruth Schwartz Cowan
pioneered feminist considerations of technology by looking at “the consumption
junction,” the place and time at which consumers make choices between competing
products.70 This scholarship outright rejects the idea that design begins and ends
with scientists and engineers and highlights the fact that women played
extraordinarily important roles in design. Feminist scholars then showed that
women helped change the design of many technological artifacts,71 including the
microwave,72 reproductive technologies,73 computers,74 and household devices.75
The takeaway from this literature is that design is not complete until users have
defined the uses and social valence of the technology in their hands. And different
users may define technology’s uses in different ways. Simplified models of heroic
male engineers doing work on their own or standing in for some objective
conception of the user risks further burdening marginalized groups and missing half
the narrative of design. This speaks to the who and when of privacy’s design law. If
design extends beyond product release, then privacy’s design law should impose
design obligations throughout the entire lifecycle of technologies, from conception

67.
68.

See Kline & Pinch, supra note 61.
See WEIBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF
SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995) (describing the evolution of design changes to bicycles based, in
part, on impact from users and other social groups independent of designers).
69. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 61 (amateur radio operators helped make the technology a
medium for broadcasting rather than just one-to-one communication); FISCHER, supra note 61
(discussing how users developed new ways to use the telephone, particularly outside cities); MARTIN,
supra note 61 (showing how rural women used the telephone in ways so unexpected to the engineers
that designed it that they had to redesign it significantly); DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA:
SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1880-1940 (1990) (discussing how communities used
electricity and electric appliances, streetlights, and trolleys in ways that advanced social goals).
70. See Ruth Schwartz Cowan, The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in
the Sociology of Technology, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe
Bijker et al. eds., 1987).
71. See Nina E. Lerman, Arwen Palmer Mohun & Ruth Oldenziel, The Shoulders We Stand on
and the View from Here: Historiography and Directions for Research, 38 TECH. & CULT. 9, 11 (1997).
72. CYNTHIA COCKBURN & SUSAN ORMROD, GENDER AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MAKING
(1993).
73. See, e.g., ADELE CLARKE & VIRGINIA OLESEN, REVISIONING WOMEN, HEALTH, AND
HEALING: FEMINIST, CULTURAL, AND TECHNOSCIENCE PERSPECTIVES (1998).
74. See, e.g., SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
(1984).
75. See, e.g., RUTH SCHWARTZ COWEN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGIES FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1983).
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to use, not just up to the moment of sale. Moreover, if users play essential roles in
design, asking companies to design for privacy before users have a chance to deploy
new products imposes unrealistic burdens. Engineers and users may not play
identical roles in design; but the sociology of technology complicates the implicit
narrative that the technology company is the sole locus of design responsibilities.
B. Privacy: What, Why, and How?
If the who and when of design law are hazy, what design law’s obligations are in
practice and why they are imposed are entirely obscured. In this section, I review the
privacy by design and values in design literatures and tease out eight different visions
privacy by design in practice and a similarly diverse pool of values they are meant
to promote. I then argue that this diversity of views and lack of clarity may prove
fatal to privacy by design as it transitions into design law. More specifically, if no
one knows either the requirements or the purposes of design law, then whether a
given strategy meets a legal requirement or falls below a legal standard is either
impossible to tell or entirely arbitrary. This also makes it difficult for those
victimized by privacy-invasive design to know how to seek redress.
1. Privacy by Design’s Many Definitions (What?)
Definitions of privacy by design have always started with the Fair Information
Practice Principles (FIPPs), which developed out of a 1973 report from the U.S.
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW).76 The HEW Report
recommended that users be informed of data use practices, have the opportunity to
correct their data, and consent to any secondary uses of their information.77 The
Report also called on companies to be transparent about their data use practices, set
limits on what data they gather (also known as data minimization), sunset data
retention, and maintain appropriate levels of security.78 Some of these same
principles—data minimization, access, transparency, and, particularly, consent—are

76. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
P ERSONAL D ATA S YSTEMS (1973), http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ [ https://
perma.cc/3ATG-ABEM ] [ hereinafter “HEW REPORT” ]. As Marc Rotenberg has explained, “[n]ot
only have Fair Information Practices played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United
States, these basic principles have also contributed to the development of privacy laws around the world
and even to the development of important international guidelines for privacy protection.” Marc
Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001). Unfortunately, the FIPPs inadequately protect our privacy in a digital
age. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490–96 (2015) (discussing the drawbacks to
notice and choice).
77. HEW REPORT, supra note 76, at 41–42.
78. Because the FIPPs are an evolving set of recommendations, this summary is based on Paul
M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2181 (2003).
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embedded in the GDPR.79 Recital 78 explicitly includes four of the FIPPs: data
minimization, transparency, access, and security.80 It would be easy, therefore, to
interpret the GDPR’s version of privacy by design as little more than the FIPPs.81
Indeed, the FIPPs are also at the core of a second definition of privacy by
design. When Ann Cavoukian described her seven “foundational” principles PbD,
she was either consciously or unconsciously relying on the FIPPs. The principles—
Proactive not Reactive; Privacy as a Default Setting; Privacy Embedded into Design;
Full Functionality; End-to-End Security; Visibility and Transparency; and Respect
for User Privacy82—echo principles of user control and transparency that were in
the HEW Report. Like the FIPPs, as Ira Rubinstein and Nathan Good have argued,
these principles are either repetitive (the first three principles are siblings, if not
triplets) or so broad that they provide little additional guidance beyond the general
notion that privacy by design is about “considering privacy issues early in the design
process.”83
A third vision of privacy by design may be just as unhelpful. The FTC says
that privacy by design refers to companies “promot[ing] consumer privacy
throughout their organizations and at every stage of the development of their
products and services.”84 On the ground, that has translated into requiring
companies to adopt privacy programs that include design considerations.
For example, in March 2011, the FTC required Google to “design and
implement[ ] . . . reasonable privacy controls and procedures” in response to a
privacy risk assessment.85 It required the same of Facebook later that year.86 But the
FTC has never explained what that means in practice.
Scholars have tried to fill that void with three other approaches to privacy by
design.87 Ira Rubinstein has related privacy by design to privacy-enhancing
79. Indeed, Article 25 lists “data minimization” as a governing “privacy principle.” Regulation
2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.
80. Id., recital 78, at 9.
81. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76
MD. L. REV. 952, 955–56 (2017) (calling the GDPR a “FIPs-based law . . . .”).
82. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9.
83. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 10, at 1338.
84. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22.
85. In the Matter of Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102 3136, at 5 (Mar. 30, 2011) (consent
order), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzz
agreeorder.pdf [ https://perma.cc/S72R-WNXA ].
86. In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092 3184, at 6 (Nov. 29, 2011), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/A8DX-Q7RM ].
87. That project arguably began with the values in design movement. Helen Nissenbaum and
Mary Flanagan have shown how designers integrate values into the products they create. Although their
project focused on digital games, the lessons for privacy by design are clear: design is not neutral, and
reflects normative decisions about what technology should look like. See, e.g., BATYA FRIEDMAN,
HUMAN VALUES AND THE DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (1997) (challenging the idea that
efficiency and functionality are the central foci of design and showing how values are integrated into
new products); HELEN NISSENBAUM & MARY FLANAGAN, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES
(2014); Katie Shilton, Technology Development with an Agenda: Interventions to Emphasize Values in
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technologies, or engineering tools that translate specific data protection laws into
code.88 By way of example, Rubinstein and Good explain that privacy by design
should require companies not merely to promise to delete user data after a limited
amount of time but rather to design a database that automatically identifies personal
information and deletes it at a pre-programmed date.89 Kenneth Bamberger and
Deirdre Mulligan suggest that privacy by design includes organizational measures
that integrate privacy professionals into a technology company’s various business
units.90 Elsewhere, I have argued that companies need to go further, integrating
lawyers and privacy professionals into design teams and acculturating designers
themselves into the ethos of privacy and ethics in design.91 This scholarship has
helped privacy by design grow from a catchphrase to a doctrine. But the diversity
of approaches to that doctrine means that design law is still unclear.
Woodrow Hartzog offers a seventh conception of privacy by design that
leverages various legal tools to guide the design of technologies that affect our
privacy. Hartzog calls on the law to “set boundaries and goals” for technology
design.92 For example, a design agenda for privacy that leverages contract, tort, and
consumer protection law would respond to the problem of “extracted consent,”
that is, the way technology companies design interfaces, agreements, and click boxes
to manipulate, nudge, and encourage us to acquiesce to a data-sucking regime.93
This and other important steps in the ecosystem of privacy by design scholarship
recognize that the law has to play a role in design. But while Hartzog identifies the
legal levers that can rein in technology’s data-hungry excesses,94 judges and
regulators still require a doctrinal map for answering specific privacy by design
questions as they appear.
The GDPR brings the eighth and most recent formulation of privacy by
design, but it is a surprisingly vague one. 95 Article 25, Section 1 of the GDPR states
that data controllers have to “implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement dataprotection principles, such as data minimization, in an effective manner.”96 Recital
78 goes into more detail, including a list of potential measures that might, if
implemented, help a company comply with Article 25.97 Such steps include
Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. SOC. FOR INFO. SCI. &
TECH. (2010).
88. See Ira Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1414–28
(2012).
89. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 10, at 1341–42.
90. See KENNETH BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 76–86 (2015).
91. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUSTON L. REV. 659 (2018).
92. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 7.
93. Id. at 211–13.
94. Id.
95. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.
96. Id.
97. Id. at recital 78, at 9.
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“minimising the processing of personal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon
as possible, transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal
data, enabling the data subject to monitor the data processing, [and] enabling the
controller to create and improve security features.”98 This list of examples is helpful,
but only to a point. As a incomplete list of technical measures, it offers companies
a quick guide to model their own compliance mechanisms.99 But it does not speak
to any organizational measures that are necessary. Nor is the language of the GDPR
at all specific. The core of Article 25’s language is the requirement to take technical
and organizational steps “which are designed to implement data protection
principles . . . in an effective manner.”100 Those principles, from consent to data
minimization to security, are covered in other parts of the GDPR. That turns Article
25’s version of privacy by design into a catch-all provision with no specific
requirements of its own.
2. Privacy by Design’s Many Values (Why?)
Design is not neutral. Technologies reflect the values embedded in them.101
That makes values particularly relevant for design law. As a product of many
different views, design law today reflects a cacophony of values, some of which are
conflicting. For example, Cavoukian’s PbD talks about transparency, consent, and
security, among other things,102 reflecting the idea that privacy by design’s purpose
is to give consumers power and control over their data.103 Woodrow Hartzog
suggests that privacy by design should focus on values like trust and obscurity. That
is, because trust is essential to privacy in the digital age,104 design should focus on
building trust and confidence.
98. Id.
99. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341,
408 nn. 359–60 (2009) (noting legislatures giving nonexhaustive lists of rules and broad instructions).
100. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.
101. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 95–119; see also Batya Friedman & Peter Kahn,
Jr., Human Values, Ethics, and Design, in THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION HANDBOOK
1177 1201 (Andrew Sears & Julie Jacko eds., 2d ed. 2008) (arguing that some values implicated in
design include freedom from bias and discrimination, property, and calmness).
102. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9.
103. Indeed, control has become the “archetype” in privacy law. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 63;
see also ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). Privacy-as-control is also a favorite in
industry. During testimony before the United States Senate in April 2018, Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg talked about returning control over privacy to consumers fifty-four times. See Facebook,
Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp. Joint Full Comm. Hearing, 115th Cong. (2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/facebook-social-media-privacy-and-the-use-and-abuse-of-data
[ https://perma.cc/58AK-DVLA ]; see also Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing,
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/
transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?utm_term=.b7cf575c7106 [ https://perma.cc/DR
W5-BC86 ].
104. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 97–107 (discussing various aspects of trust in privacy law);
WALDMAN, supra note 39, at 1–10, 47–76 (arguing that privacy is based on relationships of trust
between individuals and, thus, can protect the value of trust); Jessica Litman, Information
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Frederic Stutzman and Hartzog argue that obscurity functions as a privacy
value because when our information is hard to collect—namely, when it is in
disparate corners of the internet or sitting in dusty file cabinets in town halls—only
a few people will actually be willing to put in the time, money, and effort to identify
us.105 Placing boundaries around data collection can make us more obscure from
commercial surveillance. Obscurity, then, can also be designed in.
But so can trust, or control, or whatever value a designer, corporation,
legislator, regulator, or law professor prefers. The diverse pool of sometimes
overlapping and sometimes conflicting ideas about privacy and design, which mirror
the patchwork state of privacy scholarship as a whole,106 puts design law at risk.
3. The Effects of Confusion (How?)
When language can mean almost anything, it means almost nothing. Design
law could mean anything from following the FIPPs to making technological changes
to platforms to integrating lawyers into more diverse design teams. And the law’s
purposes and goals could be minimal or ambitious. Vague statutes have pernicious
side effects that leave design law open to attack in four related ways, crippling our
ability to vindicate our rights to privacy-centered design.
A vague design statute cannot guide corporate behavior appropriately.107 If
design law fails to provide sufficient notice of its requirements, companies cannot
know what actions, changes, or new strategies regulators want.108 That kind of
vagueness is costly and can hamper the goals of design law in the first place. Vague
requirements allow predatory companies to make minor, superficial changes and
claim their obligations fulfilled.109

Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–10 (2000); Neil Richards & Woodrow
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 451–57 (2016) (protecting
privacy can build trust between online platforms and consumers); Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs,
Privacy, and Trust: The Laudable Goals and Ultimate Failure of Notice and Choice to Respect Privacy
Online, 18 FIRST MONDAY 12 (DEC. 2, 2013), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/4838/3802 [https://perma.cc/GV7L-NDNN ]; Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Association in
a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008).
105. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 110–11; Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, The Case
for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2013).
106. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (calling privacy a “concept in
disarray”).
107. This is akin to the arguments in support of the void for vagueness doctrine. See, e.g.,
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (a law is unconstitutionally vague when people
“of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”).
108. The Supreme Court made this same argument in Kolender v. Lawson, which overturned a
vague loitering statute. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
109. See EDELMAN, supra note 18 (showing how companies create structures that frustrate the
substantive goals of anti-discrimination law); see also Josh Constine, A Flaw-by-Flaw Guide to Facebook’s
New GDPR Privacy Changes, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 18, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/17/
facebook-gdpr-changes/ [ https://perma.cc/J7RE-VBV6 ] (showing how many of the changes
Facebook made to its platform to comply with the GDPR are manipulative, superficial, and not
designed with ease of use in mind).
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Without guidance for regulators, design law risks becoming under-inclusive.
Judges, regulators, or practitioners could glom on to a single easy, understandable,
or cheap-to-implement value and run with it, narrowing design law in the same way
American privacy law reflects a scaled-down version of the FIPPs.110 There is
already some evidence this might happen. In the United States, for example, privacy
law fetishizes consent and control while ignoring other elements of privacy.111 Our
consent obsession is one reason why privacy plaintiffs have had difficulty exercising
their privacy rights in court.112 Judges often respond to claims of data misuse by
noting that users consented to share their information in the first place and assumed
the risk that it would be shared with others.113 Selectively interpreting privacy
principles is happening on the ground as well. Recent research into how technology
companies operationalize privacy law into the corporate practice and routine
suggests that easy-to-understand and high-profile mandates like security tend to
crowd out more complicated and nuanced requirements of privacy.114 This could
happen again with privacy by design.
Vague terms make it difficult for consumers to distinguish corporate
malfeasance from corporate compliance, thus disempowering consumer voices
both in the market and at law. This is true across a variety of areas of law. For
example, confusion as what constitutes a “famous” trademark complicates
trademark holders’ decisions to pursue dilution claims.115 Ambiguities in civil
procedure rules make it difficult for parties to know their procedural rights and
obligations.116 Vague terms in patent claims leave future inventors unsure as to the
patent’s coverage117 and encourages rent-seeking patent litigation.118 In all of these

110. See Rotenberg, supra note 76.
111. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67.
112. It isn’t the only reason. Plaintiffs have also had trouble articulating “concrete and
particularized” damages from privacy and data breach harms. See, e.g., Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016). But see Solove & Citron, supra note 15 (arguing that courts should apply the long history of
recognizing intangible, yet no less devastating harms, to privacy cases).
113. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn.
June 6, 2004); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
114. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 697–99.
115. See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
212, 303 n. 393 (2012) (vagueness in the term “famous” makes it difficult to know when a trademark
plaintiff is entitled to sue for dilution of a famous mark).
116. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Jacks or Better to Open: Procedural Limitations on Co-Party and
Third-Party Claims, 74 MINN. L. REV. 507, 534 (1990) (discussing ambiguities in Rule 18(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
117. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009) (“[C]laim construction may be inherently
indeterminate: it may simply be impossible to cleanly map words to things. Patent attorneys seize on
such indeterminacy to excuse infringement or to expand their client’s exclusive rights.”).
118. Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a
Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 451, 486 (2010) (“Further, the scope of
a patent’s claim is typically ambiguous and it is difficult to know with any certainty how a court will
construe it. This fact benefits nuisance-value plaintiffs, as it allows them to bring actions that lack
merit.”) (footnote omitted).
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cases, ambiguities in the law make litigation more costly and thus discourage
potential plaintiffs from pursuing legal action to vindicate their rights. Unclear
design law may, therefore, silence users and eliminate public interest impact
litigation as a privacy enforcement tool.119
Further, vague laws make enforcement arbitrary. If design law can refer to no
less than eight different practical requirements, each sitting somewhere on a range
from lax to strict, governments, regulators, and DPAs can determine whom to
investigate and what version of the law they want to apply based on their prejudices
or politics. That undermines the rule of law and makes it impossible for consumers
to know when and how to pursue their design law rights. Justice O’Connor made
this point in a decision striking down a criminal vagrancy and loitering law as
unconstitutionally vague: vague statutes permit “a standardless sweep [that] allow
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”120 It is
not difficult to imagine a scenario where a vigorous pro-privacy enforcer in France
takes an aggressive view of the design law embedded in the GDPR but a probusiness political appointee at the FTC adopts the most lax interpretation of privacy
by design.121 This eventuality could weaken the reach and dramatically undermine
the power of privacy’s design law, thus highlighting the need for clear, doctrinal
guides to interpret its practical requirements.
II. INTERPRETING DESIGN LAW
The current vague approaches to privacy by design leave the who, what, when,
why, and how of design law open to wildly different interpretations. That much is
arguably clear. That is particularly problematic for an area of law that seeks to
influence behavior ex ante (before product release) rather than ex post (after
something goes wrong). Those responsible for compliance need to know what the
law requires of them; those responsible for interpreting the law need to know how
to answer questions as they come up; those who are meant to benefit from the law
need to know what to expect and how to vindicate their rights. Therefore, everyone
needs doctrinal and practical guides or analogies.
Fortunately, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. This is not the first time
society has been confronted with new, mass-produced technologies that can cause

119. Private litigation has played an important role in enhancing consumer safety before. See
AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY
INNOVATIONS 4–49 (2010); see also Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (side impact
protection); Seliner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2002-30454 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2004) (safe doors); Dyson
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (car companies must design “a reasonably
safe container within which to make [a] journey”); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16
(Tex. App. 2007) (seat belts); Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006) (safe roofs);
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1992) (Ford Pinto case).
120. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)
121. But see William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959 (2016)
(challenging the conventional wisdom that European data regulators are aggressive and their American
counterparts are lax).
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harm without us knowing. The common law doctrine of products liability
developed in a technological, economic, and social context analogous to current
technological landscape. And it emerged to answer the same who, what, when, why,
and how questions plaguing privacy’s design law. Granted, products liability
established norms and requirements for corporate behavior through tort litigation
and focused on manufactured products that endangered our health and safety.122
Privacy by design is a statute directed at data collection tools. But despite those
differences, a privacy by design statute can learn a lot from products liability today.
This Part makes a three-step argument. First, I suggest that products liability
arose in a social context similar to today’s, just with different technologies, to answer
similar questions plaguing privacy’s law of design. Second, I establish a taxonomy
of how products liability doctrines can influence design, ultimately focusing on the
way in which it can operate as an effective analogy to describe, in a different context,
what privacy by design should mean as a legal requirement. And third, I apply that
analogy to create a model for design law, thus translating privacy by design into a
clear legal mandate.
A. The Products Liability Parallel
Products liability developed out of a series of court decisions to address harm
caused by mass-produced goods. Though originally written in the language of
“strict” liability,123 products liability never reached the apotheosis of absolute
manufacturer liability for all harms caused by products on the market.124 Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has been widely cited and

122. It also emerged because traditional claims for injury from faulty or defective products failed
because of the privity doctrine, which stated that a party only has a duty to those with whom there was
a contractual relationship. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). The
fact that there is often privity between technology companies and users through agreement to terms of
service or privacy policies does not alter my argument for three reasons. First, privacy policies are not
always considered contracts. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004
WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The usual rule in contract cases is that ‘general statements
of policy are not contractual.”) (quoting Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 740
(Minn. 2000) (en banc))); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004)
(explaining that “broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims”);
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 17:68 (2012) (“Despite the lack of a
bilateral offer and acceptance, privacy policies may become part of a contractual arrangement . . . .”).
Second, even where there is privity, privacy plaintiffs have been routinely denied access to justice, much
like those injured by defective products. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15. Third, I am not arguing
that technology companies that create tools that collect our data should be subject to strict liability or
products liability when something goes wrong. Others have made that argument. See infra notes 151 160
and accompanying text. Rather, I argue that products liability can serve as an analogy to specify privacy
by design’s requirements. For that argument, privity is immaterial.
123. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461–66 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing that the company’s liability should not be found in negligence, but
merely because it caused the harm).
124. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and Marketing
Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 958–59 (2002).
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adopted,125 holds liable one who manufactures and sells a “product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user” that causes harm after reaching the
consumer in substantially “the condition in which it was sold.”126 Over time, state
court judges have developed several standards, definitions, and tests for
determining when a product is defective.127 Many of those tests can also help tease
out the details of privacy’s law of design.
Products liability arose because judges recognized that the new socioeconomic
relationship between consumers and twentieth century technologies required
something more than just simple negligence. In fact, the same social factors that
gave rise to products liability in the first place mirror the relationships we have with
technology companies today in at least two ways.
First, data collectors are creating economic opportunities and dangers
analogous to those caused by manufacturing. Danielle Citron has compared the
advantages and risks posed by large databases of personal information to those
created by the large reservoirs of water that powered the Industrial Age.128 These
reservoirs powered textile mills, machines that churned out mass-produced
convenience goods, and large new factories.129 But when the dams holding back the
water broke, the escaping water caused significant, wide-spread property damage,
unlike any that has been seen before the Industrial Age.130 A strict liability regime,
exemplified by Rylands v. Fletcher,131 emerged to address the new problem of
massive harm without fault. A similar story is playing out today. Companies like
Facebook, Google, and Amazon are gathering terabytes of data on internet users.
That data helps them and their partners identify new commercial opportunities.132
It can connect job seekers and employers.133 It can help us find romance.134 It can
125. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
127. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1708–24
(2003) (discussing the history of the development of products liability for design defects).
128. See Citron, supra note 25, at 244.
129. See NORMAN SMITH, A HISTORY OF DAMS 169–80 (cited in Citron, supra note 25, at 281).
130. Citron, supra note 25, at 243–44.
131. Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] 3 LRE & I. App. 330 (HL).
132. Retailers and marketers use large data sets on consumer behavior to target individuals and
groups of internet users with advertisements that are ostensibly tailored to user interests. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More than
Twice as Valuable, Twice as Effective as Non-Targeted Online Ads (Mar. 24, 2010) (quoting
Howard Beales, former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at
https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/imce/nai_beales_release.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/S5E6-359R ].
133. See, e.g., Arnie Fertig, 4 Ways to Use Big Data in Your Job Hunt, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014
12:10
PM),
https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2014/02/04/4ways-to-use-big-data-in-your-job-hunt [ http://web.archive.org/web/20160912180958/https://
money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2014/02/04/4-ways-to-use-big-data-inyour-job-hunt ].
134. See We Use Math to Find You Dates, OKCUPID, https://www.okcupid.com/about
[ https://perma.cc/DA75-Y7JW ] ( last visited June 16, 2019 ).
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unlock our phones,135 turn on appliances in our homes,136 and play our favorite
songs.137 But when the barriers protecting that information break, whether from
within (unauthorized access) or without (hacking), the escaping information can
cause untold damage to victims.138 The data can be used to discriminate,139 harass,140
and cause intangible141 and pecuniary harm.142 Given the similarity between these
two types of “reservoirs of danger,” Citron called for strict liability regimes to
address harms associated with leaking databases of personal data.143
Second, technological innovations have created significant power and
information imbalances between technology companies and their users. Before
industrialization, consumers often knew the people from whom they bought
finished goods. Economic exchange was a far smaller, more intimate affair than it
is today. As such, consumers could protect themselves from poorly made goods:
they could see products before purchase, judge the trustworthiness of sellers, and
exercise their power by buying goods from another seller.144 After industrialization,
manufacturers knew what methods they used to create everything from glass
bottles145 to children’s toys146 and heavy machinery,147 but consumers possessed
neither the know-how nor the opportunity to investigate themselves, leaving them
entirely at the mercy of producers.148 Users of digital technologies have even less
power. Not only is our personal information collected and analyzed in a “black box”
of proprietary algorithms and intelligent machines,149 but the designs of technology

135. See About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/
HT208108 [ https://perma.cc/76MA-D2VU ] ( last visited June 16, 2019 ).
136. But see Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things,
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581 (2016) (noting that in the rush to connect objects to the internet, connected
is not always better).
137. See Mikey Campbell, Apple Reveals Algorithm Behind Apple Music Mixes, Execs Discuss
Past and Future of Service, APPLEINSIDER (Sept. 26, 2016 5:33 PM), https://appleinsider.com/
articles/16/09/26/apple-reveals-algorithm-behind-apple-music-mixes-execs-discuss-past-and-futureof-service [ https://perma.cc/U7ZF-2GEC ].
138. Citron, supra note 25, at 244–45.
139. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [ https://perma.cc
/F6JT-VKY8 ].
140. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014).
141. See Solove & Citron, supra note 15.
142. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, INFORMATION COMPROMISE AND THE RISK OF IDENTITY
THEFT: GUIDANCE FOR YOUR BUSINESS (2004), https://dwtprivsec.lexblogplatformtwo.com/files/
2014/04/bus59-information-compromise-and-risk-id-theft-guidance-your-business.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/YYD4-JA69 ].
143. See generally Citron, supra note 25.
144. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 231–33.
145. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 436 (exploding bottle).
146. See, e.g., Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1967) (pogo sticks).
147. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Co., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (car).
148. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 219–23; see also Mauch v. Mfr. Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.
2d 338, 345 (S.D. 1984).
149. See PASQAULE, supra note 44.
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products and platforms today tilt the power balance toward the designers and away
from users.150 Therefore, much like consumers of mass-produced goods,
consumers of digital products that commodify their data cannot act as successful
stewards of their own data safety.
As a result of these similarities, it should come as no surprise that a variety of
scholars have called for applying strict or products liability to privacy and data
breach harms. William Prosser laid the groundwork for this scholarship when he
published the now-definitive guides for privacy tort law151 and strict liability in the
same year.152 Both articles have had an outsized impact on the law153 and because
Prosser also served as the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, both
privacy and strict liability were incorporated at the same time.154 Benjamin Sachs
called for holding data collectors strictly liable for failure to keep our information
secure.155 Sarah Ludington proposed a new strict liability tort, the tort of misuse of
stored personal data, that would explicitly enforces the FIPPs.156 And Citron’s
“reservoirs” metaphor argued for applying the strict liability model of Rylands v.
Fletcher to data breaches.157
B. Products Liability and Design
Though insightful, each of these proposals aim to create liability for privacy
harms through strict tort liability litigation. Sachs refers specifically to corporate
data breaches, identity theft, and discrimination.158 Ludington’s new tort is situated
as a solution to data leaks.159 And Citron applies Rylands to database operators
because they are the ones aware of the “vulnerabilities in their computer networks”
that could lead to harm ex post.160 My goal is to put meat on the bones of a privacy
by design statute, not create a new tort. Moreover, these proposals focus on the role
150. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67; see also NOR. CONSUMER COUNCIL, DECEIVED BY
DESIGN: HOW TECH COMPANIES USE DARK PATTERNS TO DISCOURAGE US FROM EXERCISING
OUR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY ( June 27, 2018), available at https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf [ https://perma.cc/C58N-3BRD ].
151. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (reviewing privacy case law from
1890 and identifying four privacy torts).
152. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (discussing the rise of strict liability over the previous years).
153. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (citing Prosser’s Strict
Liability when adopting a rule of strict liability for defective products that cause injury to consumers);
see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 148–56 (2007) (discussing the impact of Prosser, as well as Warren and Brandeis, on
the current state of civil privacy law).
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652I (1977) (privacy torts); id. at §§
388–408 (products liability).
155. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 240.
156. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 171–72 (2006).
157. See Citron, supra note 25, at 244.
158. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 219–23.
159. See Ludington, supra note 156, at 141.
160. Citron, supra note 25, at 284.
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of strict liability; products liability today has a far more diverse toolkit. This
literature, then, only fights half the battle.
Products liability influences design along two axes: directness and specificity
(Table 1). Real or threatened litigation affects design indirectly and generally: it raises
the ultimate costs of unsafe products to incentivize the development of safer
ones.161 Incentive realignment is at least one of the justifications behind products
liability generally162 and the proposal to apply strict liability in data breach and
privacy cases.163 But because the deterrence factor only increases costs of bad
design, it cannot help courts, regulators, or designers interpret what design law
actually requires.

Decisions in products liability cases can influence design directly and
specifically by defining precisely what designs are safe and unsafe in given
circumstances for given products. For example, after Chrysler was held liable for
161. See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding manufacturer
liability encourages the production of safe products); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d
539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (noting that “[b]y imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover
hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research”); Daly
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978) (reasoning that strict liability gives manufacturers
an “incentive to produce safe products, . . . to avoid and correct product defects . . . [, and an] incentive
toward safety both in design and production”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 166 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that costs of products liability litigation encourage companies to design
safer products to bring prices in line with competitors); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25–26 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that a “manufacturer who is made liable to
the consumer for defects in a product will do what can be done to see that there are no such defects”).
162. See, e.g., LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 233 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1981)
(acknowledging that a company “will pass the costs of injuries along to the consumer in the form of
increased prices for more dangerous products and that the consumer will be more likely to buy safer
goods because they will be relatively less expensive”); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of
Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1320 (2001); Robert
L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1194 n. 22 (1996).
163. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 25, at 265–67.
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injuries to a policeman from an impact to the side of his car, automobile
manufacturers knew that they had to design cars to withstand side impact
collisions.164 And after Garrett v. Ford,165 which involved injuries from a lap seat
belt, the auto industry started including three-point rear seatbelts in their designs.166
In this way, court decisions concluding that particular designs were unsafe helped
automakers redesign their cars in specific ways to comply.167 This aspect of
products liability law, however, has its limits. Identifying precise safe or unsafe
designs may provide certainty to designers in particular industries or in given
circumstances. But it is impractical to expect courts to make all design decisions;
judges and juries are neither institutionally competent nor close enough to the
factors that go into design to do more than make specific decisions on the margins.
Relatedly, products liability law can influence design specifically, but indirectly.
For example, products liability decisions that hold companies liable for
insufficiently testing potentially dangerous substances, like the silicone in breast
implants,168 could influence any chemical company or drug manufacturer that must
test products before putting them on the market. However, this indirect pathway
for influencing the design process remains hypothetical and too disconnected from
design to answer specific questions about privacy’s design law.
This Article is focused on the fourth way products liability can influence design
ex ante—namely, directly, yet generally. Over time, products liability litigation has
developed a series of requirements and corporate behavioral norms that define what
manufacturers have to do even before they get hooked into a tort lawsuit. By
analogy, those norms and requirements offer us a new paradigm for what a privacy
by design statute should require. This includes how companies can weigh the
privacy risks against consumer benefits of new products and how to interpret the
meaning of vague terms in the law long before either the threat of litigation or courtmandated designs. To be clear, I am not proposing a products liability tort for
privacy by design. Rather, I am taking a snapshot of products liability norms and
rules and suggesting that this snapshot can flesh out what a privacy by design statute
164. Dawson v. Chrysler, 630 F.2d 950, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1980).
165. Garrett v. Ford, 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987)
166. Id. at 411 (holding that compliance with federal regulations regarding seat belts does not
pre-empt a different standard from being established through civil litigation); see also AM. ASS’N. FOR
JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS 5 (2010).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). The FTC was
given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). This direct
and specific effect of litigation is similar to how FTC consent decrees help technology companies
determine what strategies, designs, and data use practices are “unfair or deceptive” under the FTC Act.
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (arguing that the body of law created by FTC consent decrees amounts to
a common law body of jurisprudence). “Those involved with helping businesses comply with privacy
law . . . parse and analyze the FTC’s settlement agreements, reports, and activities . . . .” Id. at 585–6.
168. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 118–19 (Nev. 1998) (discussing, among
other things, the fact that insufficient testing the safety of silicone in breast implants can be used as
evidence in a products liability suit).

Final to Printer_Waldman (Do Not Delete)

1266

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

7/22/2019 7:56 PM

[Vol. 9:1239

should require in practice. After all, doctrinal analogies are common throughout the
law and particularly in privacy,169 where vague case law and statutes are constantly
being referenced to answer new questions posed by new technologies. In the
manufacturing context, products liability helped redesign dangerous products
before. It can do so again for today’s data-hungry technologies.

C. Applying the Products Liability Analogy
Products liability for design defects can answer privacy by design’s open
questions—Who is responsible for design? When does design take place? What
does design law require? What are its goals and purposes? And how can users pursue
their rights under the law?—and, thereby, transform privacy by design into privacy’s
design law.
1. Who?
Privacy by design asks data collectors and upstream technology developers to
include privacy considerations during the course of the design process.170 Though
doing so makes some intuitive sense, this allocation of responsibility is subject to an
epistemic attack based on STS and sociology scholarship that reminds us that design
is not limited to heroic engineers or the corporations that hire them.171 Products
liability had to respond to this same problem. It, too, had to allocate responsibility
to someone. But it also acknowledged that users influence design when they modify
products after purchase and when they use them in ways designers did not expect.
Rather than giving up entirely, the common law adapted to the fact that design is a
multifaceted social process by retaining manufacturer liability where consumer
modifications and uses were reasonably foreseeable. Privacy’s design law can learn
from these doctrines to place the onus of privacy design on technology companies.
In the products liability context, manufacturers must do more than design
reasonably safe products. They must design them so they can withstand both
intended uses and those uses that, though unintended or unimagined by the
designer, are reasonably foreseeable.172 In Barker v. Lull Engineering,173 for example,

169. There are really too many to list. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013 (7th
Cir. 2004) (analogizing the inevitable discovery doctrine in Fourth Amendment law to the concurrent
causation doctrine to answer a Fourth Amendment question about whether a second illegal search could
cure the defects of a first illegal search); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy
Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 670 (2006) (suggesting an
analogy from privacy to trade secret law to address the problem of “relative privacy”); Jonathan Zittrain,
What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1241–45 (2000) (analogizing privacy to intellectual property, generally, as both
doctrines concerned with control over information).
170. See supra Part I.A.1.
171. See supra Part I.A.2.
172. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1975).
173. Barker v. Lull Engineering, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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a high-lift loader that was designed without outriggers overturned while working on
a slope, injuring the lift’s operator.174 One of the manufacturer’s responses to the
plaintiff’s products liability claim was that the lift was never meant to operate on a
slope.175 The trial judge took this to heart, instructing the jury that they could only
find the manufacturer liable if its product was being used in the intended manner.176
The California Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the proper instruction had
to include uses in “reasonably foreseeable manner[s].”177 It was reasonably
foreseeable that a lift would sometimes be used on ground that was not perfectly
flat. Similarly, in Katz v. Swift & Company,178 a butcher was injured when a rubber
band securing lamb shanks snapped off.179 The court found that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the bands would cause injury if not properly secured.180
In both these cases, it was immaterial that the defendants claimed they did not
anticipate the particular use or misuse of their products. It “was sufficient that it
was foreseeable that injury might result” from uses that were reasonable, even if
unintended.181 Otherwise, if designer intent delimited liability, then car
manufacturers would be immune from lawsuits when their cars crashed and chair
manufacturers would not have to design chairs strong enough for people to stand
on; cars are meant to be driven, not crashed, and chairs are meant for sitting, not
standing. Foreseeability became the linchpin of manufacturer liability, thus
reflecting the reality of user involvement in the design process and the social
construction of cultural artifacts.
In most jurisdictions,182 moreover, manufacturer liability withstands not just
unintended uses but subsequent modifications. Thompson v. Package Machine
Company183 and Soler v. Castmaster184 are prime examples. In Thompson, the plaintiff
lost her arm while reaching inside a plastic molding machine to remove a finished
piece. She alleged several design defects, particularly to the safety mechanisms that
were supposed to keep the machine open so a completed segment of plastic could

174. Id. at 447.
175. Id. at 448.
176. Id. at 449.
177. Id. at 452, 455–56.
178. Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905 (1960).
179. Id. at 905.
180. Id. at 906 (the “defendant knew or should have known that if the rubber band were not
securely attached it might slip off and cause injury”).
181. Id.
182. New York, among a few others, is an exception. In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division, 403
N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980), the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, held that a
manufacturer of a product will not be held liable for a user’s injuries where “after the product leaves
the possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a subsequent modification which substantially
alters the product and is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Robinson v. Reed-Prentice
Division, 403 N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 1980). The majority of jurisdictions follow California’s and New
Jersey’s rule on manufacturer liability even with subsequent consumer modifications. See infra nn. 184–
90 and accompanying text.
183. Thompson v. Package Machine Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971).
184. Soler v. Castmaster, 484 A.2d 1225 (N.J. 1984).
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be removed and replaced.185 The company argued that only a modification to the
machine after it had left the factory could have caused the safety latches to
malfunction.186 The court declined to hold that a manufacturer could be immune
from liability as a matter of law simply because of a “reasonably foreseeable”
modification.187
The New Jersey Supreme Court came to a similar holding in Soler. There, the
safety gate on a die-casting machine malfunctioned, injuring the plaintiff’s hands
when he tried to remove a finished product from the mold.188 Notably, though, the
machine was not originally designed with a safety mechanism; the plaintiff’s
employer had added one that would automatically shut off the machine’s power
when the gate was open, thus allowing workers to reach in.189 The court declined to
exonerate the machine’s manufacturer, despite the modification.190 Adding safety
elements was foreseeable, the court said, especially since safety mechanisms were
available on the market when the defendant built the machine.191
Though they may not have recognized it at the time, the Barker, Katz,
Thompson, and Soler courts were wrestling with the social aspects of design and
technology. Each case shows that users do not just use; they also influence design.
By deploying machines in ways their designers did not expect—much like when
farmers used the first cars as stationary power sources192 or how rural women used
their first telephones as agents of social connection193—the plaintiffs in Barker and
Katz changed the design. In Thompson and Soler, consumers made physical
modifications to machines, much like women had for years made a variety of
adjustments to household and cooking appliances, all of which were created by men,
when the designs did not suit their needs.194 Against this backdrop, most
jurisdictions retained manufacturer liability despite user influence over design where
uses and modifications were foreseeable. This puts the onus on manufacturers not
just to design reasonably safe products (chairs that can be sat on), but also to
consider the myriad ways in which their products can be used and how those
products and uses fit into the broader ecosystem of social practice (chairs on which
one can stand to reach a high shelf).
This provides a convenient analogy to define the who of privacy’s law of
design. Most jurisdictions retain manufacturer liability for defective products
despite user impact on design. Not doing so would let manufacturers escape
responsibility too often and, therefore, undermine the goals of products liability
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Thompson, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Soler, 484 A.2d. at 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
See Kline & Pinch, supra note 61, at 768–94.
See MARTIN, supra note 61.
See Cowan, supra note 70.
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generally.195 But in a nod to the social nature of design, courts limit that
responsibility to designing for foreseeable uses. An analogous rule can be applied to
a privacy by design statute: technology companies are responsible for privacy by
design, and their duties to consider privacy from the ground up extends to the
privacy implications of all the foreseeable uses of their products. In Part II.C.3, I
discuss what that means in detail.
2. When?
But before detailing the what of design law, we have to determine the when of
design. Given that design is an ongoing process that can continue well after product
release, during what time span do corporate design law responsibilities exist?
Products liability law generally requires manufacturers to design products that are
reasonably safe from the moment of sale or distribution.196 This is mostly because
harm to consumers starts at sale.197 But manufacturer duties extend well beyond
that. Indeed, the products liability analogy suggests that privacy by design duties
should exist throughout the lifecycle of data collection tools, from conception
through use.198
Products liability scholars have long debated the point in time at which courts
should judge the safety of products.199 John Wade listed six possibilities: at the time
of manufacture, distribution, purchase, injury, trial, or at no time in particular.200
Both Restatements seemed to have settled on the time of distribution or sale. The

195. See, e.g., John Jay Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law, 14
N. KY. L. REV. 289, 306 (1987) (“Four policies are generally recognized as supporting the imposition
of strict products liability. First, the party in the best position to detect and eliminate defects should be
responsible for damages inflicted by defective products. Second, liability should be placed upon the
party best able to absorb and spread the risk or cost of injuries through insurance. Third, a remedy
should not be prevented by burdensome requirements of proof, since an injured person is not normally
in a position to identify the cause of the defect. Fourth, due to modern marketing methods, consumers
today rely on the reputation of a manufacturer and no longer accept the doctrine of caveat emptor.”).
196. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1977); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); see Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221
(Iowa 1980) (holding that a plaintiff has to show that the design was unsafe as of time product
manufactured).
197. One of the goals of products liability is to reduce and ameliorate the harm faced by
consumers. See, e.g., Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability and the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 847 (1996); see also CALABRESI, supra note 42, at 24–94; Donald
G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64
MD. L. REV. 613, 627 (2005) (discussing Calabresi’s view that tort law can protect consumers from
harm).
198. Notably, this is how Article 25 conceptualizes the when of privacy by design. Article 25(1)
states, in relevant part, that “the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for
processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures . . . .” Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48 (emphasis added).
199. John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 739 (1983) (a defect “is not defined relative to a particular point in
time”).
200. Id. at 753–54.
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Second Restatement focuses liability on a product that is “expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold,”201 implying that manufacturers are responsible for ensuring safety before
their products leave the warehouse. The Third Restatement limits defects to those
found “at the time of sale or distribution.”202 This suggests that designer and
manufacturer responsibilities end at product release.203
But these Restatement provisions do not tell the whole story. It is axiomatic
that manufacturers retain certain duties to consumers after sale.204 Manufacturers
have a duty to warn consumers of latent defects when the manufacturer discovers
them.205 The rationale for this ongoing duty is that products with latent defects
already on the market pose significant risks to consumers, and products liability law
is meant, in part, to reduce danger to unsuspecting users.206 At the same time,
however, manufacturers are rarely required to update their old products and retrofit
those on the market to accommodate the latest and best safety technologies.207
Doing so would be too onerous, administratively difficult, and prohibitively

201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1977).
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
203. See Michael B. Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer’s Duty for Subsequent Product
Alteration: Toward a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361, 363 (1988).
204. See, e.g., John S. Allee, Post-Sale Obligations of Product Manufacturers, 12 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 625 (1984) (discussing and collecting cases on post-sale duty-to-warn contexts); Victor
Schwartz, The Post Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983) (similar).
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 202 at § 10; see
also Bly v. Otis Elevator, 713 F.2d 1040, 1046 (4th Cir. 1983) (“the duty to warn is continuous and is
not
interrupted
by
manufacture
or
sale
of
the
product.”);
Comstock
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959) (there exists “duty to give prompt warning
exists when a latent defect which makes the product hazardous to life becomes known to the
manufacturer shortly after the product has been put into the market”).
206. See, e.g., Alden D. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture,
52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 81–82 (1973) (explaining that one of the goals of products liability law is to protect
consumers from dangerous materials on the market).
207. See, e.g., Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990) (no Pennsylvania
case has ever required a duty to retrofit); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964)
(a manufacturer is under a continuing duty to improve the safety of its products, even those already on
the market); Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 336–37 n. 42 (Mich. 1995) (rejecting the idea
that manufacturers had a duty to update and retrofit products based on newly available safety
technology because of the burden that would entail); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d
1299, 1308–09 (Kan. 1993) (post-sale retrofitting duties would create perverse incentives for
manufacturers). When feasible in and certain limited circumstances, however, manufacturers have been
required to remedy the danger. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453
(2d Cir. 1969) (“It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous defects in design have
come to the manufacturer’s attention, the manufacturer has a duty to either remedy these or, if complete
remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and instructions concerning methods
for minimizing the danger.”); Bell Helicopter v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(manufacturer post-sale duties required the company to “mandate replacement” of dangerous
helicopter blade system, or to strongly suggest replacement in a notice “reasonably calculated to impress
upon users the gravity of the risk, that such replacement be made.”).
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expensive.208 And most jurisdictions hold that manufacturers are immune from
post-sale liability when they sell so-called “naked” products, or dangerous
machinery that will not work upon sale unless the consumer installs whatever safety
equipment she chooses, on the theory that the original manufacturer is selling an
inoperative and, thus, not dangerous, product.209
These rules yield several lessons for the when of privacy by design.
Manufacturer duties do not end at product release. Just like latent defects in
manufactured products justify ongoing duties, privacy gaps in data collection code
that pose continual risks to user data should give rise to ongoing duties as well.210
In fact, this principle is already embodied in privacy law: data breach notification
statutes require notifying consumers without unreasonable delay if personal data
has been compromised211 and the FTC requires user notifications when privacy
policies change.212 Moreover, whereas products liability generally declines to impose
significant retrofitting duties on manufacturers because of cost and administrability,
those barriers do not exist in the data collection context because most technology
products are “tethered.”213 Tethered products, as defined by Chris Hoofnagle,
Aniket Kesari, and Aaron Perzanowski, are those that are persistently linked to the
seller, in this case, over wifi.214 Regular updates to code over an internet connection
are relatively inexpensive and easy to administer compared to the cost of rebuilding
heavy machinery that is physically beyond the control of the manufacturer.
Therefore, the products liability analogy would both obligate technology companies
to design for privacy through the moment of sale and beyond, and include ongoing
duties to update platforms to better protect privacy going forward.
3. What?
Privacy by design requires technology companies to consider privacy from the
ground up, making it endemic to their corporate culture and the products they
create. But commentators have never been clear about what that means in
practice.215 The products liability paradigm can help to specify the requirement.
Since the California Supreme Court unanimously adopted a strict liability standard

208. See Schwartz, supra note 204, at 898 (arguing that courts do not impose a post-sale duty to
retrofit, in part, because of the expense); see also, e.g., Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d at 336–37 n. 42
(declining to impose a duty to retrofit products with latest technology because of the burden on
manufacturers).
209. See, e.g., Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
210. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing standards for governing those notices).
211. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (West 2017).
212. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 167, at 616 (discussing how the FTC requires companies
to notify consumers of wrongdoing and about updates to data use practices).
213. Chris Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3318712 [ https://perma.cc/5SY9-2QY6 ].
214. Id. at 1.
215. See supra Part I.B.1.
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in products liability cases in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,216 design defects law
has evolved to include a panoply of specific tests and doctrines that tease out
manufacturer responsibilities. Products liability today is not the same as it was in
Greenman. But four elements—the risk/utility doctrine, foreseeable unintended
uses, the reasonable alternative design (RAD) test, and the duty to warn—can, when
taken together, describe the specific elements that go into manufacturers’ proactive
obligations to design safe products. I argue that the same rules can clarify technology
companies’ duties under privacy’s design law as well.
a. Balancing Test During Design
The California Supreme Court introduced the risk/utility test in Barker v. Lull
Engineering217 as one of two ways consumers could prove a manufacturer had
designed a defective or unsafe product. Barker involved a high lift loader that
overturned when it was used on a slope instead of flat ground.218 The court said
either a plaintiff could demonstrate that a product failed to perform “as an ordinary
consumer would expect”219—the consumer expectations test—or a jury could
determine that “the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweigh[ed]
the benefits of such design”220—the risk/utility test. Later, the court clarified when
to use each test.221 A consumer expectations test is appropriate when common
“everyday experience” is enough to understand how a product is supposed to
work,222 as when farmers are injured by defective tractors,223 or when hospital
workers get sick from unsafe latex gloves,224 or when weightlifters are hurt by leg
press machines they use regularly.225 For more “complex” products like cars, a riskutility test, informed by expert testimony, makes more sense.226
These tests normally operate inside adversarial litigation to determine ex post
if a manufacturer violated its duty to consumers. But they can also have a direct
effect on the design process.227 Where applicable, a consumer expectations test
encourages manufacturers to conform the design of everyday products to ordinary
216. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
217. Barker v. Lull Eng’g, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
218. Id. at 443.
219. Id. at 454.
220. Id. at 455.
221. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994). Notably, the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability does not include the consumer expectations test for design defect cases.
Scholars disagree about whether this accurately reflects the state of the law or merely models the
conservative policy preferences of the Reporters. For scholarly debate on the merits of changes brought
on by the Third Restatement, see the literature cited in nn. 238, 253.
222. Soule, 882 P.2d at 308, 310.
223. See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945–46 (Kan. 2000).
224. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001). The plaintiff
used forty latex gloves per shift. Id. at 732.
225. See Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001).
226. Soule, 882 P.2d at 309; see also, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333
(Conn. 1997).
227. See infra notes 5–169 and accompanying text; see also Tbl. 1.
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uses and user expectations. The complexity of data collection tools, however, makes
that impossible in the privacy context.228 A risk-utility test, however, encourages
companies to weigh safety dangers against the benefits of the product during the
design phase before product release. Notably, this is precisely the goal of privacy by
design.
Indeed, as scholars have noted, the problem identified by privacy by design is
that privacy is getting short shrift before technology products are released,229 forcing
privacy law to focus, rather ineffectively,230 on punishments after the fact.231 If
privacy could be considered during design, it could compete against pernicious
motives232 and the contrary incentives of corporate actors.233 This may require a
heavy lift at some companies, including creating an active privacy team integrated
into the design process234 and sufficiently powerful to make its voice heard within
the corporate dynamic.235 It would require a group of privacy lawyers inside the
design process to spot privacy issues as they come up.236 And it would require
documenting the ways in which privacy is considered during design and how the
product that emerges does not put privacy at unnecessary risk relative to its benefits.
Understood through the analogy of the risk-utility test, then, privacy by design’s
expectation that companies will consider privacy from the ground up can be
228. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 3, 28–31; Pauline Kim, Data Driven Discrimination at
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 889 (2017) (“[T]he quality or characteristic the model seeks to
maximize (the target variable) may be clearly specified, but the algorithm is so complex that it is not
possible to explain which factors drive the model’s predictions.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data,
Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2016) (describing black box
algorithms as “‘black-box’ precisely because the relationships at [their] heart are opaque—not because
their developers deliberately hide them, but because . . . they are too complex to understand”); Michael
L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 871, 886 (2016) (noting that algorithms can be so complex that the programmers do not
even understand how they work).
229. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 5 (noting the extraordinary incentives to design technologies
to enhance data collection rather than restrict it); Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at
685–89 (discussing how some engineers at technology companies simply fail to consider privacy during
design because of other pressing demands, the ambiguous nature of privacy, and a lack of corporate
attention).
230. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 747–56 (discussing how courts have generally
declined to recognized data breach harms); Strahilevitz, supra note 169, 939–46 (discussing the lack of
clear rationales in decisions “limited privacy” cases, with many results failing to protect privacy).
231. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 104, at 436.
232. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Uber Didn’t Track Users Who Deleted the App, but It Still
Broke the Rules, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2017 6:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/uber-didnt-trackusers-deleted-app-still-broke-rules/ [ https://perma.cc/T9YC-A4E5 ].
233. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014)
(arguing that technology companies have primary incentives to collect more information about
consumers in order to compete with their competitors); Rubinstein, supra note 88, at 1431–44
(discussing the role of market incentives in corporate decisions to adopt privacy-enhancing
technologies).
234. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 711–25 (arguing for corporate
organizational changes to better integrate privacy into the design process).
235. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 90.
236. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 714–15.
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translated into design law as a requirement to perform a balancing of privacy harms
against consumer benefit during the design phase of new products.237
b. Foreseeable Uses
Although there is considerable scholarly disagreement on whether it should
be part of the law of products liability,238 foreseeability was included in the Third
Restatement. It defines a defective product as one where the “foreseeable risks of
harm” could have been avoided by a safer design.239 Foreseeability is also part of
the doctrine of unintended uses, as discussed above.240 The foreseeability doctrine
offers another helpful analogy for privacy’s law of design. When conducting riskutility balancing, technology companies should consider the privacy implications of
all foreseeable uses of a product.241
Data-based technologies have been used in many ways their designers might
not have intended. For example, Facebook claims it was designed to bring people
together,242 not to spread fake news243 or manipulate user behavior.244 Livestreaming technology may have been designed to help reach a vast audience at low
cost, but it has also been used to broadcast sexual assault245 and mass shooting.246
And location-based tracking may facilitate a host of modern conveniences, but it
237. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 127–28.
238. Although I use foreseeability here, I am not arguing that liability for defective products
should be based on a foreseeability standard. Rather, the goal of this Article is to describe ex ante
obligations for privacy by design. Liability is not an issue. For arguments against including foreseeability
in products liability, please see, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the
Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988); Stephen P. Croley & Jon
D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683
(1993); Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More
Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990); Keating,
supra note 162; Kysar, supra note 127, at 1790; Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of
Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1993).
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
240. See supra Part II.C.1.
241. See, e.g., Gallub, supra note 203, at 404 n. 2424 (noting that “foreseeability of product’s uses
establishes the parameters of its manufacturer’s responsibility”).
242. See, e.g., Josh Constine, Facebook Changes Its Mission Statement to ‘Bring the World Closer
Together,’ TECHCRUNCH ( June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/bring-the-worldcloser-together/ [ https://perma.cc/7KD8-XYC8 ].
243. See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes, Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook Made Mistakes on ‘Fake News,’
Privacy, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 9, 2018 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerbergfacebook-made-mistakes-on-fake-news-privacy-1523289089 [ https://perma.cc/92P8-BMDG ].
244. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science, FORBES
( June 28, 2014 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/28/facebookmanipulated-689003-users-emotions-for-science/#3df42df7197c [ https://perma.cc/KV8T-TA3Y ].
245. See, e.g., Brittney McNamara, Girl Who Live Streamed Rape on Periscope Sentenced to Prison, TEEN
VOGUE (Feb 15, 2017 6:40 PM), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/girl-live-streamed-rape-onperiscope-sentenced-prison [ https://perma.cc/X9RT-S8D2 ].
246. See Kate Klonick, Inside the Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2019 12:16 PM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-theteam-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting [ https://perma.cc/JD7V-MM4S ].
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has also been a tool of intimate partner harassment and invasions of privacy.247
Admittedly, only some of these uses are arguably foreseeable. And reasonable
people can disagree; foreseeability in tort law is usually a question of fact for a jury
anyway.248 But in the ex-ante design context, foreseeability would be a fact-based
conversation among technology product designers, privacy professionals, users,
professional associations, journalists, and independent and academic experts, each
of whom may bring unique perspectives on foreseeable uses. At a minimum, using
the design phase to consider at least the foreseeable potential dangers of privacycompromising technologies can make technology products safer.
For example, the genetic testing company 23andMe recently formed a
partnership with the pharmaceutical giant, GlaxoSmithKline, to use 23andMe’s
storehouse of DNA data to develop new drugs.249 This eventuality was arguably
foreseeable from the moment 23andMe’s saliva-based home DNA tests were
designed. The company included the possibility in its privacy policy.250 But the
partnership with Glaxo raises several privacy concerns, including the risks in
transferring personal data, the potential dangers for blood relatives who never
consented to use of their DNA, and the likelihood that 23andMe customers may
not have understood the implications of their consent. Considering these questions
before product release could have led to several design modifications to the product
that could pre-empt problems after the fact. Granted, consent to participate in
research was designed as an opt-in, rather than opt-out. But the company could
have gone further by making the opt-in far clearer, including explaining exactly how
the consumer’s DNA data will be used,251 and more noticeable, whether through an
on-screen pop-up during registration or a brightly-colored insert in the package
itself. Designers could have also created anonymization and security tools with
future partnerships in mind. Executives could have also minimized the amount of

247. See, e.g., DIANA FREED ET AL., “A STALKER’S PARADISE”: HOW INTIMATE PARTNER
ABUSERS EXPLOIT TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 2018), http://www.nixdell.com/papers/stalkers-paradiseintimate.pdf [ perma.cc/RW9L-MJMW ].
248. See, e.g., Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Wingett
v. Teledyne Indus., 479 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind. 1985) (holding that the question of foreseeability is properly
for a jury); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847–48 (N.H. 1978) (same).
249. See Maggie Fox, Drug Giant Glaxo Teams up with DNA Testing Company 23andMe, NBC
NEWS ( July 25, 2018 2:00 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/drug-giant-glaxoteams-dna-testing-company-23andme-n894531 [ https://perma.cc/LC2Z-2TZ9 ].
250. See Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/
[ https://perma.cc/KL5W-ES95 ] ( last visited June 16, 2019 ) (“If you choose to consent to participate
in 23andMe Research, 23andMe researchers can include your de-identified Genetic Information and
Self-Reported Information in a large pool of customer data for analyses aimed at making scientific
discoveries.”).
251. Compare id. (referring only to “use of your data for scientific research purposes”), Frequently
Asked Questions, “Privacy,” ALL US RES. PROGRAM https://www.joinallofus.org/en/faq [ https://
perma.cc/EL5V-UMHA ] ( last visited June 16, 2019 ) (explaining precisely when, how, and why
personal information may be used).
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data they would share with pharmaceutical companies.252 These steps cannot
guarantee safety from privacy or data breaches, but they can pinpoint inflexion
points and ameliorate the risk.
c. A Reasonable Alternative Privacy-Protective Design
That said, merely requiring companies to engage in a balancing test of
foreseeable benefits and harms is still rather vague. A third products liability
analogy—the reasonably alternative design, or RAD, test—can specify what
technology companies should be balancing. The rich literature on RAD is
voluminous, including whether it reflects the state of the common law253 or
undermines the entire project of strict liability for defective products.254 Those
debates are for another time. For our purposes, a RAD is, on its face, easy to
understand: if a safer way of designing a product with available technology255 would
have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm256 without undue cost, the manufacturer
should have chosen that design instead of the more dangerous one. Or, put another
way, a safer design’s costs (including manufacturing costs and reduced product
functionality, among others) must be less than the costs of foreseeable injuries
prevented by incurring the costs of the safer design.257
Wherever one stands on the role of RAD in design defect litigation, the
concept can serve as a convenient analogy for privacy’s design law. Like RAD,
where a manufacturer has to weigh the costs of safer designs against the foreseeable
injuries, privacy by design requires a technology company to weigh the costs of
more privacy-protective design—including privacy defaults, opting in to data
collection, just-in-time notifications, enhanced consents, data minimization,
252. This principle is embodied in the GDPR. See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(c),
at 35 (data minimization).
253. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998) (justifying the conclusion that RAD had been adopted
by many jurisdiction through analysis of case law); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability Section 2(B): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1408–13 (1994) (reviewing cases challenging the conclusion that RAD was
supported by the majority of jurisdictions at the time). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article takes no position on whether demonstrating a RAD should be part of a products liability
claim. Rather, it is based on the presumption that RAD is at least part of the law of products liability
for design defects today, something even critics have come to accept. See Vandall, supra 1413–20 (noting
that some jurisdictions include RAD as either one factor to consider in risk-utility balancing and that
other jurisdictions require defendants to prove that there was no RAD).
254. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and
the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 891 (2005) (seeing RAD as reneging
on the promise of strict liability in products liability).
255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reps. n. cmt. d(IV)(B)
(1998). The Restatement uses the phrase “state of the art” and notes that the phrase “has been variously
defined by a multitude of courts. For some it refers to industry custom or industry practice; for others
it means the safest existing technology that has been adopted for use; for others it means cutting-edge
technology.”
256. Id. at § 2 cmt. f.
257. See id. at cmts. d, f.
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restrictions on processing, limitations on collections and storage, and so forth—
against foreseeable privacy risks and any loss in program utility or function. If a
safer, more privacy-enhancing option exists without undue sacrifices in function,
privacy’s design law would require companies to choose the safer option.258
The Third Restatement places the burden of proving a RAD on a plaintiff
during litigation.259 But that is a minority view; only a few states have abandoned
the Second Restatement for the Third in this regard.260 In Barker v. Lull
Engineering,261 for example, the California Supreme Court concluded that when
consumers had everyday experience with the products at issue, design defects
should be determined on a consumer expectations test. But when the product was
too complex for ordinary comprehension, risk-utility balancing made more sense.262
As several courts have already concluded,263 the burden of demonstrating that no
other RAD exists is the manufacturer’s responsibility.264 In the context of privacy’s
law of design, the very complexity of algorithmic platforms265 and technology
companies’ continued insistence on maintaining the secrecy of their data collection
tools also suggests that they should shoulder the burden of demonstrating that a
RAD did not exist when they built and sold their products.
To support this more directed balancing test, companies can learn from
privacy impact assessments (PIAs) at government administrative agencies. PIAs are
analyses of how personal information is collected, used, shared, and maintained.266
Their purpose is to ensure that designers, executives, privacy professionals, and
other relevant employees have consciously incorporated privacy protections
throughout the lifecycle of a product. More specifically, PIAs identify and evaluate
privacy risks, consider alternatives, identify strategies to mitigate risks, and help
258. See also HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 128.
259. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
260. See Vandall, supra note 253, at 1408–13.
261. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
262. See, e.g., id. at 455–56 (the risk-utility test “places the burden on the manufacturer, rather
than the plaintiff, to establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design
process, an injury-producing product should nevertheless not be found defective.”); see supra notes 218–
27 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Onati v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983) (applying Barker);
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (“We hold that the plaintiff need only show
that he was injured and that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design. The defendant
may then avoid liability for a defectively designed product by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that ‘on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.’”).
264. See Vandall, supra note 253, at 1408–13.
265. See PASQUALE, supra note 45, at 140–42; see also Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of
Machine Learning (A Provocation), LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT
BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteriesof-machine-learning-a-provocation/ [ https://perma.cc/849V-Q8BS ] (calling complex algorithms the
“sweet mystery of machine learning”).
266. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS, https://www.ftc.gov/siteinformation/privacy-policy/privacy-impact-assessments [ https://perma.cc/LB7H-YAC4 ] ( last
visited June 16, 2019 ).
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articulate the rationale for the final product.267 Therefore, PIAs help technology
products designers conduct their own version of a RAD analysis, ensuring that
privacy-protective options get a fair shot during design. Although simply adopting
a version of a PIA would be insufficient—a commitment to privacy has to be
instantiated into the culture, as well268 and not merely a symbol of compliance269—
the protocol would force companies to make a record of their privacy
considerations and foster transparency and accountability.270
d. Privacy Notices and Design
Alongside conducting a risk-benefit analysis and determining if a RAD exists,
manufacturers also have duties to warn consumers of foreseeable dangers.271
Technology companies that collect our data have similar duties to warn; indeed,
informing users of a company’s data use practices is at the heart of the notice-andchoice regime that governs much of consumer privacy law today.272 But, as I have
argued elsewhere, neither data collectors nor regulators have paid much attention
to the manner in which privacy notices are presented to users, despite the fact that
design and aesthetics can be manipulative.273 An analogy to the duty to warn in
products liability would establish notice as a design obligation and bring much
needed corporate and regulatory attention to the design of privacy policies.
There are two types of warnings in products liability law. At the point of sale,
manufacturers are required to warn customers of dangers associated with
foreseeable uses of the product.274 If sometime after sale, manufacturers learn or
should have learned that their products are dangerous, they have a duty to make a
reasonable effort to issue a post-sale warning to consumers.275 And the general rule
is that point-of-sale and post-sale warnings have to be “adequate,” or reasonable
under the circumstances.276 Post-sale duties to warn are more limited than those at
the time of sale. Warning customers at the time of sale is relatively easy: a
manufacturer can place labels on products before they leave the warehouse.277 After
267. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008).
268. Id. at 78.
269. See EDELMAN, supra note 18 (discussing how merely symbolic structures have replaced
substantive progress as evidence of compliance with civil rights laws).
270. See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1752 (2015) (recommending the adopting of
Privacy Impact Notices (PINs), combining transparency and accountability in good privacy design).
271. See, e.g., Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir. 1995) (manufacturers
have a duty to warn of dangers “reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer of the product”).
272. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 167, at 592 (noting how privacy policies are used to fulfill
the “notice” part of “notice and choice”).
273. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23.
274. See, e.g., Melancon v. W. Auto Supply Co., 628 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
275. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 n.2 (D. Minn. 1982).
276. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); Levin v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 248 A.2d 151 (Md. 1968).
277. See Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa 1999).
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sale, after a product leaves the control of the manufacturer, practical barriers make
post-sale warnings far more expensive and difficult.278
In certain cases, courts have gone further, describing what adequate notices
should look like. Warnings need to be “clear and specific,” and clear and
unequivocal warnings on the product itself or in the owner’s manual have
sufficed.279 Notices that are too long can undermine their effectiveness. As the
Fourth Circuit has stated, “Well-meaning attempts to warn of every possible
accident lead over time to voluminous yet impenetrable labels—too prolix to read
and too technical to understand.”280 Several courts have also held that warnings
cannot be simple lists of risks; rather, they must convey information in a format and
using language that gets a consumer’s attention and conveys the seriousness of the
risks involved.281 Notice adequacy in products liability law is, therefore, a matter of
“display, syntax and emphasis.”282 Warnings must also be attuned to a consumer’s
level of knowledge, or reflect a foreseeable consumer’s lack of experience or
skill operating the product.283
Privacy notices can learn from this jurisprudence. The two types of notices in
privacy map neatly on manufacturers’ warnings. First, privacy policies, which
developed first as industry’s way to stave off regulation284 and spread further under
state and federal mandates,285 are akin to point-of-sale warnings. Privacy policies
278. See id. at 694; see also Schwartz, supra note 204, at 895–96.
279. See Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999).
280. Id.
281. See Brochu, 643 F.2d at 657. A product warning “may be inadequate in factual content, in
expression of the facts, or in the method by which it is conveyed.” Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666
F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987).
282. See D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 112 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1973) (adequacy “depends
upon the language used and the impression that it is calculated to make upon the mind of an average
user of the product” and involves “[q]uestions of display, syntax and emphasis”).
283. See Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (when developing
product warnings, manufacturers have to consider inexperience or lack of skill of a foreseeable class of
consumers). It is worth noting that many, but certainly not all, of the cases to describe this more detailed
standard for adequacy involve drugs or chemicals. See, e.g., Brochu, 643 F.2d at 653 (oral contraceptives);
Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. at 1498 (vaccines); D’Arienzo, 310 A.2d at 226 (hair dye). The Restatement
(Third) of Torts immunizes prescription drug manufacturers from design defect liability, see James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151 (2001),
suggesting there may be a trend to treat drug manufacturers differently than other manufacturers. But
see George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109
YALE L.J. 1087 (2000). But, the standard is also used in other types of product liability cases. See,
e.g., Dalton v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 703 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983) (car); Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 1979), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 612 F.2d 905 (5th
Cir. 1980) (motorcycle).
284. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal
Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587, 593 (2007) (“Online privacy policies have appeared . . . as
voluntary measures by websites . . . .”); see also Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm
Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2047 (2000) (noting that an FTC threat for greater regulation
resulted in a substantial increase in the number of websites offering privacy policies); Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 167, at 593–94.
285. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23, at 90–95 (showing how state and
federal statutes require privacy policies).
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warn us of all the ways in which our data will be collected, used, and shared. They
are, however, confusing.286 No one reads them.287 They are long288 and difficult to
understand.289 And they are designed and presented to us in ways that make them
manipulative of our behavior.290 Second, so-called “just-in-time” notices, roughly
like post-sale warnings, are presented to us not when we first buy a Google Phone
or visit a website, but at the moment just before data collection occurs while using
a platform, product, or app, allowing us to navigate our disclosure behavior more
effectively.291 Just-in-time notices have been endorsed by the FTC and
recommended as a best practice in the mobile privacy ecosystem.292 But just-in-time
notifications today are often take-it-or-leave-it and far more about encouraging
users to just click “yes” and move on than consider their disclosure behavior.293
Privacy policies and just-in-time notifications today are ineffective because
they are inadequately designed. In products liability, the design of warnings matters
because courts recognize that presentation influences comprehension and only
comprehensible notices can adequately protect consumers.294 The same should be
true of privacy notices. Under this analogy, “a clear, concise warning of potential”
privacy concerns would be required.295 It could be supplemented by a longer privacy
policy intended for regulators, but technology companies and regulators should
design and present privacy notices with an eye toward ordinary user comprehension,
286. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and
Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 40, 87 (2015) (“[A]mbiguous wording in typical
privacy policies undermines the ability of privacy policies to effectively convey notice of data practices
to the general public.”).
287. See, e.g., George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy
Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING
15, 24 (2004).
288. George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan & Henry Greene, A Longitudinal Assessment of Online
Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 238, 243 (2006). Lorrie Cranor estimates
that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read the privacy policy of every website
she visited. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy
Notice and Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012). This translates to about 54
billion hours per year for every U.S. consumer to read all the privacy policies she encountered. See
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 540, 563 (2008).
289. See Mark A. Graber, Donna M. D’Alessandro & Jill Johnson-West, Reading Level of Privacy
Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 642, 642 (2002).
290. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23.
291. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY 15 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staffreport/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ZSJ6-AGPV].
292. See id. at 1.
293. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 23–67; see also Norwegian Consumer Council, supra note
141. Consider, for example, the take-it-or-leave-it approach of cookie notifications, which are often
presented as acknowledgements with “ok” or “dismiss” buttons rather than with options to “accept”
or “decline” cookies.
294. See D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 112 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1973); Brochu v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981).
295. D’Arienzo, 310 A.2d at 112.
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using simple statements, user-friendly aesthetics, and colors and tables,296 while
making them accessible to users through pop-ups and even more “visceral” forms
of notice that ensure understanding.297 Moreover, because technology companies
face none of the practical burdens manufacturers used to face when trying to reach
consumers post-sale, just-in-time notifications should follow the same rules.
4. Why?
The next building block of privacy’s design law is identifying its underlying
values. This is an important task, as it helps make sense of confusing statutory
language298 and helps regulated entities craft effective compliance strategies. But, as
discussed above, the various definitions of privacy by design reflect a variety of
different values, including control, trust, and obscurity, among others.299 Indeed, it
is hard to imagine privacy values not embraced by some definition of privacy by
design. A products liability paradigm offers a different perspective: fairness.
Fairness was at the heart of Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling,300 where he laid out the policy arguments justifying strict liability for
defective products. Whereas manufacturers can anticipate some of the dangers in
their own products, consumers of mass produced goods cannot.301 Whereas
manufacturers are well situated to bear the costs of preventing injury through new
designs, consumers are generally unprepared to handle the overwhelming cost of
injury to life and limb.302 And whereas manufacturers are the ones placing
dangerous goods on the markets, consumers are the ones getting injured.303 As the
torts scholar Gregory Keating put it, as between the party benefiting from
production and the party that “happen[s] to be victims,” those that cause harm as a
result of their profit-making activities should be responsible, and not only because
they can more easily absorb and distribute the loss.304 It is, rather, a matter of simple
fairness.305 As a weapon of fairness, products liability law aims to reset the
imbalance between producers and consumers, holding manufacturers’ responsible
for the harm they cause.

296. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23, at 117–24.
297. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1034–44 (2012).
298. See, e.g., KARL LLWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268–77
(1960); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
667 (1958) (arguing that rather than trying to discern the meaning of specific words, the task of
interpretation is to look at the statute and make it a “coherent, workable whole”).
299. See supra Part I.B.2.
300. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
301. Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56
VAND. L. REV. 653, 667 (2003) (calling this rationale “enterprise liability”).
305. Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (2004).
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The wide social, informational, and resource asymmetry between technology
companies and their users mirrors the power imbalance between manufacturers and
consumers described by Justice Traynor in Escola, thus requiring a similar rebalance
through a fairness lens. Technology companies know (or should know) about the
privacy risks their products create, but because those data collection tools are “black
box” proprietary algorithms, ordinary consumers are ill-equipped to protect
themselves.306 Technology companies are some of the most dynamic, nimble, and
richest businesses operating today,307 which makes them far more capable than
ordinary consumers to address privacy dangers. Users can only try to deal with the
enormous costs after something goes wrong. Fairness dictates that technology
companies should shoulder the responsibility of designing products that better
protect users from privacy dangers that users cannot protect against themselves.
Fairness also recognizes the undeniable connection between privacy and
equality.308 Traditionally marginalized social groups require data privacy in ways
entrenched majorities often fail to recognize. As Mary Anne Franks has explained,
“[a]ttentiveness to race, class, and gender is vital to understanding the true scope of
the surveillance threat. Marginalized populations, especially those who experience
the intersection of multiple forms of subordination, also often find themselves at
the intersection of multiple forms of surveillance: high-tech and low-tech, virtual
and physical.”309 And those forms of surveillance can be designed into new
technologies. For example, surveillance apps, geosocial tracking, and other tools are
becoming common weapons in intimate partner violence.310 A fairness-in-design
approach puts the onus on the designing company to consider how design will not
just affect the ordinary consumer, but also marginalized consumers, many of whom
have even less of an opportunity to protect themselves from privacy harms.311

306. See PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 3, 28–31, 34–36, 78–79.
307. Apple recently became the first American company worth $1 trillion. See Mark Gurman,
Apple Becomes First U.S. Company to Hit $1 Trillion Value, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018 11:57 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-02/apple-becomes-first-u-s-company-to-hit-1trillion-market-value [ http://web.archive.org/web/20190330222838/https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-08-02/apple-becomes-first-u-s-company-to-hit-1-trillion-market-value ].
Moreover, on July 26, 2017, Facebook reported $9.3 billion in revenue for the second quarter of that
year, up 45 percent from the same period in 2016. Profits rose to $3.9 billion, up 91 percent from
the previous year. See Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Profit and Revenue Surge, Despite Company
Predictions of a Slowdown, N.Y. T IMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/
technology/facebook-users-profit.html [ https://perma.cc/62LT-RW7J ].
308. See, e.g., JUDITH W. DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF
TECHNOLOGY (1997) (“Protection of privacy enhances and ensures the freedom from such scrutiny,
pressure to conform, and exploitation.”).
309. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 464 (2017).
310. See, e.g., Rahul Chatterjee et al., The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence, IPV TECH
RES. (2018), https://www.ipvtechresearch.org/pubs/spyware.pdf [ http://web.archive.org/web/2019
0510222447/https://www.ipvtechresearch.org/pubs/spyware.pdf ] (presented at the 2018 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy).
311. This is especially true when predictive algorithms reflect data and human biases. See, e.g.,
Julia Angwin et al., supra note 139.

Final to Printer_Waldman (Do Not Delete)

2019]

PRIVACY’S LAW OF DESIGN

7/22/2019 7:56 PM

1283

5. How?
Privacy’s law of design must also provide sufficient notice to users, allowing
them to both distinguish compliance from malfeasance and practically enforce their
right to a design process that considers their privacy from Day 1. Unfortunately,
pathways to vindicating design rights have rarely been part of the privacy by design
literature. Scholars either ignore it and focus on corporate ex ante obligations312 or
deputize regulators like the FTC, European DPAs, and state attorneys general as
privacy enforcers.313 Undoubtedly, regulators should be (and are) empowered to
force technology companies to follow privacy’s law of design. And, as Woodrow
Hartzog has argued, the FTC is well-situated to consider manipulative and abusive
design as part of its mandate to police “unfair and deceptive” business practices.314
But saddling consumer safety regulators with the entire burden of enforcing
privacy’s law of design is risky. Both the FTC and European DPAs are overworked
and lack the budgets and institutional capacities to address bad corporate behavior
on their own.315 Users must be able to validate their own design rights through a
private right of action built into a privacy by design statute. Products liability offers
several insightful lessons to make that a reality.
Privacy plaintiffs have struggled to prove particularized harm because courts
have routinely found their claims of injury—risk of future harm, preventative
measures to guard against identity theft, and anxiety about data security316—too
speculative.317 In so doing, judges are requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate harms as
312. Ann Cavoukian’s PbD, for example, makes no mention of privacy by design as a consumer
right capable of validation through the courts. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9.
313. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 138–42 (describing how the FTC has already litigated
cases involving deceptive design tactics).
314. Id.; see also Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785 (2015)
(arguing that the FTC has the capacity to regulate the deceptive designs of robots).
315. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 169, at 600 (stating that the FTC averages 10 enforcement
actions per year); see also EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION
AUTHORITIES 42 (2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Dataprotection_en.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JS52-NE4R ] (“In many Member States, DPAs are not in a
position to carry out the entirety of their tasks because of the limited economic and human resources
available to them. This is the case in Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia,
Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia.”); Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our
Right to Be Forgotten, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:30 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search [ https://perma.cc/NU7B-UADQ ]
(“Most of Europe’s 31 national data protection authorities are cumbersome, under-resourced
bureaucracies issuing occasional, random fines and reacting when a court occasionally clarifies the
law.”).
316. For a taxonomy of alleged data breach harms and an insightful discussion of how courts
have conceptualized those harms, see Solove & Citron, supra note 5, at 749–54. “The overarching
concern is that risk and anxiety are speculative, subjective and, worse, susceptible to manipulation by
attorneys who desire to manufacture injuries out of a data breach.” Id. at 774.
317. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (plaintiffs failed to show that
ongoing government surveillance affected their work in any way); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38,
40, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (increased risk of identity theft is too speculative); In re Jetblue Airways Corp.
Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that “loss of privacy” is not a
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if an invasion of privacy is no different than getting hit by a car, a fist, or falling
debris. But the two injuries are quite different and in ways that the law has long
understood. Privacy plaintiffs should not be crammed into a physical harm box;
other types of harms are recognized at common law. The tort of assault, where the
shibboleth of liability is fear, not physical or pecuniary harm, is more than 600 years
old.318 Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) compensates for
emotional harm as well.319 Daniel Solove and Danielle Citron have argued that an
objectively reasonable person standard can determine the reasonable cost of
ensuring against the intangible, though no less real, risks associated with data
breaches, thus creating a cognizable injury.320 Failing to consider privacy during
design creates technology products that put our privacy at risk.321 As Ryan Calo has
argued, this kind of harm is analytically distinct from the category of harm
cognizable in torts like assault and IIED.322 It also resembles the intangible harms
Solove and Citron discussed in the data breach context.323 Therefore, assessing the
reasonable costs of injury prevention could operate in design litigation as well.
As a statute, privacy’s design law can impose statutory damages that obviate
the need for any user to identify specific harm, much like the GDPR. Products
liability justifies this. Products liability recognizes that in addition to a specific injury
caused by a faulty product, defective designs on the market carry social costs: they
can cause harm to many people at the same time, burden ordinary individuals with
outrageous recovery costs,324 and allow predatory manufacturers to gain a
competitive advantage by shortcutting safety.325 These social costs are one of the

sufficiently concrete injury to survive a motion to dismiss). But see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663
Fed. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that increased risk of identity theft and reasonably
incurred mitigation costs to avoid future harm were sufficient for standing because hackers allegedly
had stolen plaintiffs’ information and the defendant offered free credit monitoring services to help
consumers mitigate danger). Recently, in Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff had to show “concrete” injury for Article III standing, but that “intangible
harm” and “risk” could suffice if it bore a “close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit.”
318. I de S et Ux. v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348).
319. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140–58 (1992) (discussing
various examples included IIED).
320. See Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 774.
321. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 1–21 (discussing the pervasive role of design and its
manipulative potential to take away our data).
322. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 363 (2014).
323. See generally Solove & Citron, supra note 15 (discussing how data breaches cause increased
feelings of risk, anxiety, and emotional harm).
324. See Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay in
Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 505, 506 n.4 (1994) (“Design defects thus threaten equally all those who
come into contact with the particular product, and therefore bring with them the potential for
widespread injury and liability.”); see also CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 24, 70, 72 (arguing for shifting
social costs of accidents from individual victims to those more capable of handling them).
325. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 86 (1992).
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reasons why products liability permits punitive damages in some circumstances.326
Therefore, significant statutory damages can be imposed to deter technology
companies from evading their design responsibilities to society.
6. Privacy’s Design Law Summary
Tying these who, what, when, why, and how strands together gives us a vision
of privacy’s law of design. Under this model, a privacy by design statute would
require anyone who develops and markets products that collect and process user
data327 to, when conceiving, designing, developing, and using those products,328
balance the products’ benefits to consumers against their foreseeable privacy risks
and only place in commerce those products that achieve reasonably similar
consumer benefit with the least privacy risk.329 This duty includes the responsibility
to inform users, throughout the lifecycle of products, of how the products collect
and process data and of all foreseeable privacy risks in a manner that adequately and
comprehensibly conveys those risks to an ordinary user.330
This approach to privacy’s law of design has several advantages. First, it
reflects both the social nature of design and the importance of fairly allocating
responsibility for protecting personal privacy. Current privacy law, based on the
myth of control and extracted consent,331 forces unprepared users to bear the
burden of protecting their information in the face of manipulative design. As
Woodrow Hartzog has written, even when platforms give control to users through
various options, privacy centers, and click boxes, consent “can act to shift the
burden of responsibility for protecting privacy to people who are less equipped to
handle it . . . . Control . . . comes [with] a practical obligation” to exercise that
control.332 When users do not, as primed by design,333 technology companies
translate our “inaction as acquiescence.”334 This formulation of privacy by design
is consciously meant to tip the balance back toward corporate responsibility for
privacy.

326. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (punitive damages
may be awarded for “outrageous conduct”); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 227–28 (Colo.
1984) (punitive damages intrauterine device case); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46–47
(Alaska 1979) (allowing punitive damages where gun manufacturer knew of defective design yet still put
the revolver in commerce), modified, 615 P.2d 204 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Rinker
v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that “there is no fundamental
reason for excluding products liability cases from the cases in which punitive damages may be
recovered”); see id. at 67–69.
327. See supra Part II.C.1.
328. See supra Part II.C.2.
329. See supra Part II.C.3.
330. See supra Part II.C.3.d.
331. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67.
332. See Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy and the Dark Side of Control, IAI NEWS (Sept. 4, 2017), https:/
/iainews.iai.tv/articles/privacy-the-dark-side-of-control-auid-882 [ https://perma.cc/J8DH-F5YQ ].
333. See NOR. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 293, at 12–39.
334. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 66.
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Second, this model of privacy’s design law is clear, yet flexible. It provides a
governing structure and some level of certainty as to what the law requires without
mandating specific designs. The only specific limit it places on designers is the
requirement to choose a reasonably alternative privacy-protective design when one
exists. Otherwise, design law guarantees that privacy will have a fair shake during
design. And for judges and regulators seeking to interpret design law’s requirement,
a products liability model gives them the tools to answer vanguard questions as they
come up. It also gives users clear guideposts for pursuing their design rights through
regulators like the FTC or directly through the courts.
Third, despite its flexibility, it nevertheless places limits on predatory,
opportunistic corporate behavior. Absent a requirement to consider privacy during
design and to market only those products that achieve similar goals with privacyprotecting tools, many dangerous technologies are making their way to unsuspecting
consumers. For example, there is no reason why a smartphone flashlight app needs
to collect terabytes of user data and share it with advertisers.335 Nor should an app
track us after we delete it.336 Privacy’s design law would restrict this kind of
deception.
That said, some might object to this formulation of privacy’s law of design as
arbitrary; that is, ask why products liability? Although it is true that other analogies
besides products liability—consumer protection, for example337—could bring
clarity to privacy by design, products liability for design defects makes the most
sense. As I argued above, privacy by design and products liability developed in
similar socioeconomic circumstances to address similar problems of design. They
both focus on the way new technologies are built and how they affect real people.
That other options exist does not detract from the validity of the products liability
analogy.
This proposal may also trouble those who feel that judges, juries, and
regulators do not belong meddling in the design process. Indeed, if privacy’s law of
design requires technology companies to demonstrate that products sold to users
did not have a reasonable alternative privacy-protective design, the judgment of
courts or regulators could supplant the judgment of designers themselves. Such
concerns are overblown. Products liability for design defects has been around for
decades, and overtime, judges have developed flexible standards for determining
what is safe and reasonable. At no time have judges replaced designers. For example,
courts decided that building a car with seatbelts capable of inflicting injury during
an accident is unreasonably dangerous,338 but those judges never designed new
seatbelts themselves. Rather, they set out boundaries, made value judgments, and
335.
2014 2:30
XN ].
336.
337.
338.

See Robert McMillan, The Hidden Privacy Threat Of … Flashlight Apps?, WIRED (Oct. 20,
AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps/ [ https://perma.cc/ASQ9-YH
See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, supra note 232.
See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 123–26.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Ford, 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987).
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represented society’s interests in designing safe cars. That said, if privacy’s design
law shines some light on the “black box” of technology design, that might be a good
thing. Technology companies today reap enormous benefit from zealously guarding
their algorithmic secrets. And yet, as Frank Pasquale has shown, opaque data
collection tools have the potential to influence and manipulate human behavior.339
They can discriminate,340 and cause substantial harm to real people.341 Technology
companies are even using the opacity of their data products market technologies
without taking responsibility if something goes wrong.342 Peering into the black box
to ensure social justice concerns like safety and privacy are at least part of the design
process is long overdue.343
A third related objection is that this formulation of privacy’s design law would
stifle technological innovation. Again, I disagree. Despite the prevalence of the
argument that regulation stunts innovation, there is very little evidence in support.344
Indeed, creativity and innovative thinking often thrive within constraint.345 And
even if that were not the case, I am unwilling to surrender to the intellectual
hegemony of innovation. Sometimes, there are other things that matter more,
including fairness and protecting users from predatory, data-hungry design.
CONCLUSION
Privacy by design today is a lot of hype with very little substance. Although it
has enormous potential to reset the power imbalance between data collectors and
users, it suffers from too much ambiguity. It has yet to define its who, what, when,
why, and how. And without that, it cannot transition from a buzzword to a legal
mandate.
339. See PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 18.
340. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., supra note 139.
341. See Sidney Fussell, AI Professor Details Real-World Dangers of Algorithm Bias, GIZMODO
(Dec. 8, 2017 5:00 PM), https://gizmodo.com/microsoft-researcher-details-real-world-dangers-ofalgo-1821129334 [ https://perma.cc/JGX9-8JV7 ] (discussing several harms to users from black box
algorithms).
342. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 729 (2007) (noting that DNA typing “weathered
a series of challenges related to the reluctance of private companies to divulge claimed proprietary
secrets”); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1356–71 (2018) (discussing several cases in which courts have denied
motions to disclose how secret algorithms impacted criminal justice).
343. See PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 189–220 (calling for an “intelligible society,” where we can
understand how data inputs generate the effects algorithms have on us).
344. See Robert Atkinson & Les Garner, Regulation as Industrial Policy: A Case Study of the
U.S. Auto Industry, 1 ECON. DEV. Q. 358 (1987) (finding regulation had a positive impact on
innovation in the auto industry); Richard Newell, Adam Jaffe & Robert Stavins, The Induced Innovation
Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1999) (finding innovation as a
result of imposition of energy conservation standards); Katherine J. Strandburg & Yafit Lev-Aretz,
Better Together: Privacy Regulation and Innovation Policy (forthcoming 2019) (demonstrating that little
evidence exists for the argument that privacy regulation will stifle technology innovation).
345. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015)
(the constraints imposed by copyright law promote the creativity of subsequent authors).
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This Article set out to facilitate that transition by answering privacy by design’s
open legal questions. It began by laying out those questions, and it relied on science
and technology and sociology scholarship to identify the built-in complexities and
assumptions of each. With this background, and drawing from the law of products
liability for design defects, the Article then offered a new vision for what privacy by
design should mean in practice. And that analogy makes sense. Both doctrines
emerged in similar socioeconomic contexts to answer similar questions. Both share
the similar goals of creating safer products and protecting consumers from harm.
Both recognize that the best way to do that is to have an impact on ex ante design
rather than to wait for something to go wrong. Both want to be sufficiently flexible
to balance the need for regulation with breathing room for dynamic technological
change.
Privacy by design has been around for over a decade. But as it matures so must
its scholarship. Privacy studies on design need to shift from ideas to substance if
design law’s impact is going to match its potential. Future scholarship must apply
this model of privacy’s law of design to specific questions as they come up. It must
also be tested to determine if this, or any other, vision is being operationalized on
the ground, at the technology companies designing the digital products we use every
day and among data protection regulators and policymakers. This research can take
the form of ethnographic interviews and controlled experimentation. Policymaking
about privacy by design should not only consider the paradigm proposed in this
Article, but it should focus on the purposes and goals privacy by design is meant to
achieve. In this Article, I focused on protecting consumers, alleviating power
imbalances, removing manipulative and privacy—invasive technologies from the
market, and, above all—fairness. Privacy’s law of design, whatever form it takes,
can be successful when it embraces these values.

